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THE

MONROE DOCTRINE

A CONCISE HISTORY

OF ITS

ORIGIN AND GROWTH

BY

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BOSTON
PUBLISHED BY GEORGE B. REED
LAW BOOKSELLER AND PUBLISHER
1885

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University Press:
JOHN WILSON AND SON, CAMBRIDGE.

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PREFACE.

THE design of the author is to present a concise and impartial history of a subject which for more than sixty years has been of importance to the nation and of interest to the people.

He desires to acknowledge the aid derived from the collection of authorities by Mr. J. F. Jameson, Ph. D., in President Gilman's "Life of Monroe," and to express his thanks to his friend Mr. W. E. Foster, of the Providence Free Public Library, for several timely suggestions.

G. F. T.

BOSTON, Feb. 2, 1885.

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THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

CHAPTER I.

THE CAUSES WHICH LED TO THE DECLARATION OF PRESIDENT MONROE.

By the treaty of Nov. 30, 1782, Great Britain formally acknowledged the sovereignty and independence of the United States. The struggle terminated by this convention left the American people poor in material possessions, but rich in those experiences which, however trying, are ever designed to shape individual character, and thus to contribute to national prosperity. Pertinent to our inquiry is the consideration of the growth of a popular conviction that it was impolitic for this continent to become a party to European disturbances, and that European monarchical institutions should not be allowed a foot-hold here.

The growth of a national sentiment was slow. First came the Confederation, — only a weak

expression of a national idea, but followed in a few years by that closer union which at its inception seemed to derive a measure of vigor from the directive genius of Washington. Even then the Fathers recognized the advantage of their isolation. A wide ocean separated them from their former foe. Now and then some foreign enthusiast wrote or sung of the coming land beyond the sea,[1] or some advocate of absolutism deprecated the apparent success of the American experiment; but the majority of Europeans were doubtless indifferent to the expansion of the new Republic. However, there was an apprehension on the part of many Americans that foreign Governments viewed the growing power of the United States with disfavor and alarm. This apprehension occasionally found expression in the public prints and in the speeches of public men. The opinion was prevalent that America belonged to Americans, and that to preserve our institutions we must not become a party to any foreign alliance. Copious quotations might be made;[2] but the declaration of Washington in his Farewell Address is sufficient: —

[1] See Sumner's Prophetic Voices.

[2] See Gilman's Life of Monroe, chap. vii. (American Statesmen Series).

"The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.

"Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

"Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient Government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon, to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.

"Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and

prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?"

Whether, as is often maintained, the declaration of President Monroe is the logical deduction from this emphatic warning of Washington, it is not our purpose to inquire; but certain it is that this American idea of non-intervention in European affairs and of opposing European intervention in ours at last obtained such a hold upon the popular mind that nothing was necessary but an occasion to call forth from the highest constituted authority its assertion as a national doctrine.

That the Monroe Doctrine, therefore, is something difficult to understand, as many seem to believe, is far from the truth. It is the enunciation of a patriotic principle by a patriotic President, and it was called forth in the following way.

The right of every European State to increase its dominions by pacific measures has been long admitted. But there has been publicly acknowledged for more than two centuries a right of interference whenever the ambitious designs of any of the great rulers has tended to the disturbance of the proper distribution of power.

This doctrine is called the "balance of power." It does not prohibit colonization or the acquisition of territory outside the limits of Europe, nor does it include States beyond those limits, as they have no apparent influence on European affairs.

By many this doctrine has been lauded as the best possible means of preventing any disturbance of a necessary ratio of power; by others it has been denounced as an adherence to a barbarous principle and as a pretext for unjustifiable interference. It has been repeatedly held up by John Bright as the cause of dishonorable and bloody conflicts, and it has been characterized by Robert Lowe as "that tradition which has been the pest of Europe." [1]

After this right had received full confirmation by positive acts of interference, it was natural that a more extreme claim should be maintained. Accordingly several European powers at the time of the French Revolution avowed the right to put down any revolutionary movement in that continent even when their aid was not invoked by the established Government. The continental powers were not slow to make this claim good by actual interference in the

[1] Speech at Croydon, "Times," Sept. 13, 1876.

affairs of France; but a declaration of war on the part of England was regarded as hardly justifiable, as she was indebted to a revolution for the development of her own institutions. A pretext, however, was not long wanting, and she soon became a participant in that fearful contest which deluged Europe in blood for nearly a quarter of a century.

With the downfall of Napoleon came the formidable arrangement known as the Holy Alliance, the parties to which were Russia, Austria, and Prussia, and which was generally believed to be hostile to popular rights and to the freedom of nations. This was succeeded in September, 1818, by the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, in which the five great Powers participated; namely, Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and France. This alliance accomplished the removal of the army of occupation from France, and it is said that some of the contracting parties at least expressed extreme views as to the necessity of interference whenever the supremacy of absolutism was endangered. At the Congress held at Troppau, in Silesia, October, 1820, which was removed later in the same year to Laybach, in Styria, it was proposed to interfere in the affairs of Naples, where a revolution had

broken out; but England resolutely protested. However, the revolution was suppressed by Austrian arms, and absolutism was restored. Another Congress met at Verona, in October, 1822, to consider the insurrection which broke out in Spain in the middle of the preceding year.

It should be remembered that Spain, the proudest and perhaps the most powerful nation in Europe in the days of Charles V. and Philip II., had now degenerated into a second-rate Power. She was not only unable to quell her own internal dissensions, but her long-prized American dependencies were in open revolt, and were slipping from her grasp. At this Congress of Verona, England, through her envoy, the Duke of Wellington, again declined to become a party to any agreement of interference. But a French army, with the approval of the other Powers, soon after occupied Spain and suppressed the insurrection.

These proceedings at Verona hastened the formal publication of the declaration known as the Monroe Doctrine. The subject of helping Spain to recover her revolting colonies in America was there discussed, but the proposal again met with the vigorous opposition of England.

The commercial supremacy of England at

that period was unquestioned, — a supremacy which she was zealous to maintain. Her trade with the South American colonies was both considerable and increasing, and it was natural that she should view with alarm any intervention by European powers which should result in the resubjugation of those countries to Spain, and consequently in the readoption by the latter of a restrictive commercial policy. On the other hand, to do her justice, she was the most advanced nation in Europe, and it was natural that, in the remembrance of her own constitutional development, she should deprecate European interference in American affairs. Besides, she was fast moving along in the plane of civil progress. Already there were indications that the extension of popular suffrage could not be long delayed. Only a decade was to elapse before the passage of the Reform Bill, which was not many years after to be followed by the Repeal of the Corn-Laws.

While, therefore, she may have been somewhat influenced by sympathy with a struggling people, her chief motive was unquestionably a selfish one. Her administration of foreign affairs at this period was in the hands of Mr. Canning, who was not only eminently fitted by

attainments and experience to discharge the duties of the position, but thoroughly committed to that policy which should advance her commercial interests. Our minister at the Court of St. James was Richard Rush, a gentleman of varied attainments and great abilities; while our Secretary of State was John Quincy Adams, who had at heart not only the interests of this country and continent, but from his experience in various diplomatic positions in Europe was probably of all Americans the best acquainted with the temper of European courts, and thus the best fitted to thwart, by a vigorous policy, their aggressive intentions.

While the danger was impending, Mr. Canning, in August, 1823, proposed to Mr. Rush that the Governments of England and of the United States should publish "a joint declaration before Europe," in opposition to the designs of the alliance in regard to this continent; the substance of which should be, that while the two Governments desired no portion of those colonies for themselves, they would not view with indifference any foreign intervention in their affairs, or their acquisition by any third Power. He was most earnest and persistent in urging upon our minister the necessity of such a step; and he

declared that a proposal would be made for a European Congress, to consider the affairs of Spanish America, and that Great Britain would not participate in its counsels unless the United States was also represented. As to the Congress, Mr. Rush replied that it was the traditional policy of the United States to take no part in the politics of Europe; and as to the declaration, he remarked that he was without instructions from his Government; yet he would assume the responsibility, provided England would comply with one request. The United States had already acknowledged the independence of the Spanish-American republics, and their acknowledgment by England was the condition precedent upon the performance of which Mr. Rush agreed for his own country to unite in the "joint declaration." This, Mr. Canning declined to do, and the declaration was never made.

Upon the rejection of his proposal by Mr. Rush, Mr. Canning felt that he must emphatically discountenance the apparent designs of the Government of France. Accordingly he boldly asserted to the Prince de Polignac that Great Britain would not permit any European intervention in Spanish-American affairs; and to his great surprise the Prince disavowed for his

Government any intention so to interfere, and acquiesced in the opinion of Mr. Canning that the reduction of the colonies by Spain was utterly hopeless.

Mr. Canning's biographer remarks as follows:

"By the declarations of the Prince de Polignac in this important conference, it is not unfair to conclude if the projects of the French Cabinet were, as they were supposed to have been, to have indemnified France for the expenses of the invasion of Spain by territorial acquisitions in Spanish America, that those projects were in a great degree laid aside in consequence of the firm and decided tone taken by Mr. Canning. But whether they were abandoned or not, the conviction of the French Government that 'it was utterly hopeless to reduce Spanish America to the state of its former relations to Spain' being avowed, and 'the design of acting in any case against the colonies by force of arms' being abjured, were of the utmost value in preparing the way for the ultimate measure of recognition on which, in the event of their being gratified, Mr. Canning had resolved."[1]

[1] Stapleton's Life of Canning, ii. 32, 33.

CHAPTER II.

THE DECLARATION ITSELF.

As it is our purpose to dwell chiefly upon the genesis and development of the Monroe Doctrine, it becomes important to consider a few events which preceded the declaration of President Monroe.

In the early days of this century the title to the northwestern territory of North America was claimed by Great Britain, Russia, and the United States. The settlement of their differences will be considered later on;[1] but for a long time each pushed its claim with firmness and persistency.

In a communication to Mr. Rush, dated July 2, 1823, in relation to this controversy, Mr. Adams made the following statement: —

"These independent nations [that is, those of South America and Mexico] will possess the rights incident to that condition, and their territories will of course

[1] See chap. viii.

be subject to no exclusive right of navigation in their vicinity, or of access to them by any foreign nation. A necessary consequence of this state of things will be, that the American continents henceforth will no longer be subject to colonization. Occupied by civilized nations, they will be accessible to Europeans and each other on that footing alone; and the Pacific Ocean, in every part of it, will remain open to the navigation of all nations in like manner with the Atlantic."

A few days after, on the 17th of the same month, Mr. Adams remarked to Baron Tuyl, in an interview relative to this territorial dispute, that "we should contest the right of Russia to *any* territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments."[1] Mr. Charles Francis Adams, the editor of the Diary from which this is taken, appends a note to the effect that this is "the first hint of the policy so well known afterward as the Monroe Doctrine."

Just after this interview between Mr. Adams and Baron Tuyl the conversations between Mr. Rush and Mr. Canning took place, to which reference has been made in the preceding chapter.

[1] Diary, vi. 163.

A full account of Mr. Canning's suggestions or requests, as well as his information of the attitude of the continental Powers, was at once transmitted by Mr. Rush to Mr. Adams, and the matter was brought to the notice of the President. The latter considered the situation so grave a one that he solicited the opinions of the ex-Presidents Madison and Jefferson. Mr. Madison stated that the circumstances of the case and our relations to the new republics were such as to call "for our efforts to defeat the meditated crusade."[1] Mr. Jefferson was even more explicit: —

"The question presented by the letters you have sent me is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a nation; this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark on it under circumstances more auspicious. *Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs.* America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that

[1] Works, iii. 339.

of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavor should surely be to make our hemisphere that of freedom."

The President's message bears date Dec. 2, 1823. Shortly after its beginning appears the following passage: —

"At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg, to arrange, by amicable negotiation, the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal had been made by his Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous, by this friendly proceeding, of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor, and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his Government. In the discussions to which this interest has given rise, and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed

[1] Works, vii. 315.

and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers."

Later on, just before the close of the message, the President says: —

"It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the result has been so far very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse, and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defence. With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the Allied Powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This

difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments. And to the defence of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. *We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those Powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.* With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere; but with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, *in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.* In the war between those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.

"The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the Allied Powers should have thought it proper, on a principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried on the same principle is a question to which all independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote; and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its Powers; to consider the government *de facto* as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy; meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every Power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the Allied Powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our Southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference. If we look to the com-

parative strength and resources of Spain and these new Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other Powers will pursue the same course."

In his annual message of Dec. 7, 1824, the President again referred to Spanish-American affairs as follows: —

"Separated, as we are, from Europe by the great Atlantic Ocean, we can have no concern in the wars of the European Governments, nor in the causes which produce them. The balance of power between them, into whichever scale it may turn in its various vibrations, cannot affect us. It is the interest of the United States to preserve the most friendly relations with every Power, and on conditions fair, equal, and applicable to all. But in regard to our neighbors our situation is different. It is impossible for the European Governments to interfere in their concerns, especially in those alluded to which are vital, without affecting us; indeed, the motive which might induce such interference in the present state of the war between the parties, if a war it may be called, would appear to be equally applicable to us. It is gratifying to know that some of the Powers with whom we enjoy a very friendly intercourse, and to whom these views have been communicated, have appeared to acquiesce in them."

While the President emphatically declares the policy of this country in regard to Europe to be "not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its Powers," we must especially note and continually bear in mind during the remainder of this history that the substance of the declaration is contained in three inhibitions: —

1. *No more European colonies on these continents.*

2. *No extension of the European political system to any portion of this hemisphere.*

3. *No European interposition in the affairs of the Spanish-American republics.*

In the reference to colonization the British nation did not seem to concur; but according to Mr. Rush, that part of the declaration which dealt with European intervention was hailed by the entire English people with joy and exultation; and in the British Parliament it was the subject of extravagant encomiums from such men as Mr. Brougham, Sir James Mackintosh, and Lord John Russell. The Spanish-American deputies in London were transported with joy, and Spanish-American securities at once rose in value; the allies soon abandoned their hostile intentions, and intervention proved to be nothing more than a mere purpose or threat.

On the 20th of January, 1824, Henry Clay, then Speaker of the House of Representatives, moved the following resolution in committee of the whole on the state of the Union: —

"*Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled*, That the people of these States would not see, without serious inquietude, any forcible intervention by the Allied Powers of Europe, in behalf of Spain, to reduce to their former subjection those parts of the continent of America which have proclaimed and established for themselves, respectively, independent governments, and which have been solemnly recognized by the United States."

This resolution was never called up, and one of like tenor offered by Mr. Poinsett, of South Carolina, met with a similar fate.

Thus very soon after its announcement the Monroe Doctrine failed to receive legislative confirmation.

It becomes important before dismissing this subject to refer to the part presumably taken by Mr. Adams in the preparation of those portions of the message we have already quoted. There has recently come to light the following extract[1] from the diary of William Plumer, who

[1] Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vi. 358.

was a member of Congress during Monroe's administration : —

"I have strong reason to believe that this part of the message [that is, that relating to foreign affairs] bears the direct impress of Mr. Adams's genius. The ground assumed and the doctrines inculcated are certainly his, and if he did not write that part of the message (as the minister writes the king's speeches in England), I have little doubt that he submitted to the President in writing his views of what the message ought to contain so far as his department was concerned, and that the President, in preparing his message, followed very closely not only the views but the language of the Secretary. Adams told me that the President had doubts about that part of it which related to the interference of the Holy Alliance with Spanish America ; said he believed it had better be omitted, and asked him if he did not think so too ?

"Adams replied, 'You have my sentiments on the subject already, and I see no reason to alter them.' 'Well,' said the President, 'it is written, and I will not change it now.' This was a day or two only before Congress met."

CHAPTER III.

THE PANAMA CONGRESS.

THE quotation from the diary of Mr. Plumer which concludes the preceding chapter confirms the opinion generally entertained, that Mr. Adams did something more than merely contribute to those passages of the President's message which refer to the threatened intervention of European powers. Mr. Adams's fervid patriotism was doubtless quickened by an apprehension, amounting almost to a conviction, that the adherents of absolutism in Europe were determined to let no opportunity slip to impede in some way the progress of democratic institutions on this continent. His continuance in public office, therefore, was a guaranty of the continuance of his foreign policy; and very soon after his accession to the Presidency as the successor of Mr. Monroe an opportunity to continue that policy was presented, in the invitation of several of the South American republics to the Govern-

ment of this country to participate in the deliberations of the Congress of American States to be held at Panama.

These South American republics were now rejoicing in the assurance of their own autonomy. It was in 1808, nearly twenty years before, that the interference of Napoleon in the affairs of Spain enabled them to sever their connection with the mother country and to assert their independence. Even then a long struggle was inevitable. In vain they looked to the monarchies of Europe for succor or approval; their only hope of recognition was in the Government of the United States. Mr. Clay became particularly prominent in the espousal of their cause. Early in the year 1818 he made a passionate appeal in the House of Representatives for immediate recognition; and it seems that the condition of those provinces was, on May 13, 1818, one of the subjects of discussion at a meeting of the Cabinet.[1] Recognition of the new republics by this country was delayed for four years longer, and it was followed not very long after by their acknowledgment by Great Britain. The inference therefore is natural, that upon his acceptance of the office of Secretary

[1] See Works of John Quincy Adams, iv. 91.

of State under President Adams, Mr. Clay was as ready to join in any effort to extend help to the new republics as he had been to champion their cause in the House of Representatives.

Spain had not yet given up all hope of re-subjugating her former dependencies; but coercion without the aid of some other European power was practically an impossibility. Their sovereignty and independence thus acknowledged by the two great English-speaking nations, the young republics began to agitate the calling of a Congress at Panama, to which the Governments of the American States (including the Government of this country) should be invited to send representatives to discuss questions and adopt measures particularly affecting the welfare and development of the American continents.

Here it should be noted that Mr. Clay, in his instructions of March 25, 1825, to Mr. Poinsett, Minister of the United States to Mexico, directed him to urge upon the Government of that country the utility and expediency of asserting the principles laid down in the message of President Monroe of Dec. 2, 1823. In regard to the principle that the American continents are not henceforth to be considered as subjects for

future colonization by any European power, Mr. Clay remarked: "There is no disposition to disturb the colonial possessions, as they may now exist, of any of the European powers; but it is against the establishment of new European colonies upon this continent that the principle is directed."[1]

At about the time when these instructions were given to Mr. Poinsett, Mr. Clay informed the ministers of Colombia and Mexico, Messrs. Salazar and Obregon, that the President thought that the United States ought to be represented at Panama if preliminary points could be satisfactorily arranged; "such as the subjects to which the attention of the Congress was to be directed, the nature and the form of the powers to be given to the diplomatic agents who were to compose it, and the mode of its organization and its action."[2]

Messrs. Salazar and Obregon, on the 2d and 3d of the following November respectively, addressed communications to the Secretary of State, defining in a general way the probable subjects of discussion at the Congress. Mr. Clay replied on the 30th of the same month that

[1] British and Foreign State Papers, 1825, 1826, p. 487.
[2] Ibid., p. 457.

there was not a satisfactory compliance with the President's desire as to the arrangement of preliminary points; yet the President had decided to send commissioners, provided the Senate should give their advice and consent. The same intention was also on the same day communicated to Mr. Canaz, the representative of the Government of Central America.

Only a few days after, on the 6th of December, appeared the President's message, in which he announced the acceptance of the invitation of the republics of Colombia, of Mexico, and of Central America to the United States to take part in the deliberations of the Congress at Panama.

On the 26th of the same month the President sent a special message to the Senate, in which he stated his motives for acceding to the measure and also the probable subjects of discussion at Panama. He concluded by nominating Richard C. Anderson, of Kentucky, and John Sergeant, of Pennsylvania, to be Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary. The following passage from the message particularly refers to our subject of inquiry: —

"An agreement between all the parties represented at the meeting, that each will guard, by its own means, against the establishment of any future

European colony within its borders, may be found advisable. This was more than two years since announced by my predecessor to the world as a principle resulting from the emancipation of both the American continents. It may be so developed to the new southern nations that they will all feel it as an essential appendage to their independence." [1]

On March 15, 1826, the President submitted a message to the House of Representatives in which, after referring to that portion of President Monroe's message deprecating future European colonization, he remarked as follows: —

"The principle had first been assumed in the negotiation with Russia. It rested upon a course of reasoning equally simple and conclusive. With the exception of the existing European colonies, which it was in no wise intended to disturb, the two continents consisted of several sovereign and independent nations, whose territories covered their whole surface. By this their independent condition the United States enjoyed the right of commercial intercourse with every part of their possessions. To attempt the establishment of a colony in those possessions would be to usurp, to the exclusion of others, a commercial intercourse which was the common possession of all. It could not be done without encroaching upon existing rights of the United States. The Government of Russia has never disputed these posi-

[1] British and Foreign State Papers, 1825, 1826, p. 391.

tions, nor manifested the slightest dissatisfaction at their having been taken. Most of the new American republics have declared their assent to them; and they now propose, among the subjects of consultation at Panama, to take into consideration the means of making effectual the assertion of that principle, as well as the means of resisting interference, from abroad, with the domestic concerns of the American Governments.

"In alluding to these means it would obviously be premature at this time to anticipate that which is offered merely as matter for consultation, or to pronounce upon those measures which have been or may be suggested. The purpose of this Government is to concur in none which would import hostility to Europe, or justly excite resentment in any of her States. Should it be deemed advisable to contract any conventional engagement on this topic, our views would extend no further than to a mutual pledge of the parties to the compact, *to maintain the principle in application to its own territory, and to permit no colonial lodgments or establishment of European jurisdiction upon its own soil;* and with respect to the obtrusive interference from abroad, if its future character may be inferred from that which has been, and perhaps still is, exercised in more than one of the new States, a joint declaration of its character, and exposure of it to the world, may be probably all that the occasion would require."[1]

[1] British and Foreign State Papers, 1825, 1826, p. 450.

Later on, the President considers the question whether the acceptance of the invitation might not have a tendency to change the policy, advocated by Washington, of avoiding foreign alliances.[1] He argues that the counsel of Washington "was founded upon the circumstances in which our country and the world around us were situated at the time when it was given;" that Europe has still her set of primary interests, and that our distant and detached situation remains the same; but that the Spanish-American colonies have now been transformed into eight independent nations with reference to whom our situation is neither distant nor detached. Our territorial expansion and national development in the interval have been such that America has now "a set of primary interests which have none, or a remote relation to Europe."

The President therefore concludes that the acceptance of the invitation, "far from conflicting with the counsel or the policy of Washington, is directly deducible from and conformable to it;" and that it was no less conformable to the declaration of President Monroe that the extension of the European political system to

[1] See page 3.

any portion of this hemisphere would be regarded as dangerous to our peace and safety.[1] After quoting this particular declaration Mr. Adams proceeds as follows: —

"To the question which may be asked, whether this meeting, and the principles which may be adjusted and settled by it, as rules of intercourse between the American nations, may not give umbrage to the Holy League of European powers, or offence to Spain, it is deemed a sufficient answer, that our attendance at Panama can give no *just cause* of umbrage or offence to either; and that the United States will stipulate nothing there which can give such cause. Here the right of inquiry into our purposes and measures must stop. The Holy League of Europe itself was formed, without inquiring of the United States whether it would or would not give umbrage to them. The fear of giving umbrage to the Holy League of Europe was urged as a motive for denying to the American nations the acknowledgment of their independence. That it would be viewed by Spain as hostility to her, was not only urged, but directly declared by herself. The congress and administration of that day consulted their rights and duties, and not their fears. Fully determined to give no needless displeasure to any foreign Power, the United States can estimate the probability of their giving it, only by the right which any foreign State could have to take it, from their

[1] British Foreign and State Papers, 1825, 1826, p. 453.

measures. Neither the representation of the United States at Panama, nor any measure to which their assent may be yielded there, will give to the Holy League, or any of its members, nor to Spain, the right to take offence. For the rest, the United States must still, as heretofore, take counsel from their duties rather than their fears."

The debate in the Senate upon the proposed mission was extremely acrimonious. Serious charges were brought against the President, and the policy and purposes of the administration were denounced as of a dangerous character. It was claimed that a participation in the deliberations of the Congress could be of no benefit to this country, and might be the means of involving us in international complications. However, the Senate at last concurred in the appointment of Messrs. Anderson and Sergeant as Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary.

The concurrence of the House was required in order to afford the appropriation necessary to carry the Executive measure into effect. Daniel Webster was then a member of that body, and in April, 1826, in committee of the whole, he delivered a remarkably able speech upon the duty of the House. It was not their duty

constitutionally to decide, he said, "what shall be discussed by particular ministers, already appointed, when they shall meet the ministers of the other Powers," but simply to vote the necessary appropriation. The matter would thus be left, where the Constitution had left it, — "to Executive discretion and Executive responsibility." After reviewing the events which preceded the declaration of Mr. Monroe, he declared: —

"I look on the message of December, 1823, as forming a bright page in our history. I will neither help to erase it or tear it out; nor shall it be by any act of mine blurred or blotted. It did honor to the sagacity of the Government, and I will not diminish that honor. It elevated the hopes and gratified the patriotism of the people. Over those hopes I will not bring a mildew; nor will I put that gratified patriotism to shame." [1]

The statement by Mr. Adams in regard to the parties to be represented at the conference that "each will guard, by its own means, against the establishment of any future European colony within its borders" [2] has been often criticised, and sometimes denounced as a limitation of the inhibition by Mr. Monroe of European coloniza-

[1] Works, iii. 205. [2] See page 27.

tion. Mr. Dana maintains that on the assumption "that a sovereign State would not permit other sovereign States to appropriate its territory by colonization," Mr. Monroe simply declared "*the fact*, that the whole continent was within the territory of some responsible State, and not *feræ naturæ*, and so open to appropriation;" and therefore that the proper view of Mr. Adams's proposal is "that each State represented at the Congress should make for itself the declaration which Mr. Monroe made for the United States in 1823, — that is, that its territories were not open to appropriation by colonization, — and pledge itself to resist any attempts in that direction." [1]

It is proper to remark that Mr. Adams's administration was not a popular one, and it is therefore probable that much of the opposition to the mission was inspired by personal feelings and partisan motives. Few measures in the history of the country have excited more intemperate discussion, or created greater antagonism between a President and Senate.

Messrs. Anderson and Sergeant, provided with elaborate instructions from Mr. Clay, at last set

[1] Wheaton, edited by Dana, § 67 n.

out to attend the meeting at Panama; but before their arrival that Congress had assembled, discussed the three considerations of *independence*, *peace*, and *security*, and adjourned. On March 3, 1829, nearly three years after, the President, in laying before the Senate a copy of Mr. Clay's instructions to the deputies, said, that while there was no probability of the renewal of negotiations, "the purpose[s] for which they were intended are still of the deepest interest to our country and to the world, and may hereafter call again for the active energies of the Government of the United States." [1]

If this statement may be regarded as a prophecy, then the recent action of the United States Congress in making an appropriation for sending three commissioners to the countries south of us may be regarded as its fulfilment. Just before the late President Garfield was shot he made the resolution, which was carried out by his successor, of issuing invitations to all the independent Governments of North and South America to meet in a Peace Congress at Washington. These invitations were afterward recalled or suspended, in order that Congress might give an opinion upon the expediency of

[1] Benton's Abridgment, x. 252.

the step; and on the 7th of July, 1884, an act was approved making the appropriation referred to above, and providing that "said commissioners shall ascertain the best modes of securing more intimate international and commercial relations between the United States and the several countries of Central and South America, and for that purpose they shall visit such countries in Central and South America as the President may direct." [1]

[1] U. S. Statutes, 1883–1884, chap. 333, p. 235.

CHAPTER IV.

YUCATAN.

In his annual message of Dec. 2, 1845, President Polk, in reiterating the doctrine of Mr. Monroe, and expressing his "cordial concurrence in its wisdom and sound policy," added that the "existing rights of every European nation should be respected; but it is due alike to our safety and our interests that the efficient protection of our laws should be extended over our whole territorial limits, and that it should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy, that no future European colony or dominion shall, with our consent, be planted or established on any part of the North American continent." [1]

These remarks were made as the conclusion to a long statement relative to the differences subsisting between the Governments of Great Britain and the United States as to the disputed territory in the northwest.[2] On the 14th of

[1] Congressional Globe, 29th Congress, 1st session.

[2] See chap. viii.

the following month leave was asked in the Senate to introduce a joint resolution practically embracing the principle announced in the President's message. In resisting its introduction, Mr. Calhoun expressed views which a little over two years later were more forcibly and elaborately expressed in the debate in the same body upon the bill to enable the President to take military occupation of Yucatan.

On April 29, 1848, the President in a special message called the attention of Congress to the fact that the white population of Yucatan had called upon the United States for help against the Indians, who were waging against them a war of extermination; offering, if aid should be granted, to transfer the "dominion and sovereignty" of the peninsula to the United States, and stating that similar appeals had been made "to the Spanish and the English Governments." He further stated that while it was not his purpose to recommend a policy of acquisition, yet the situation of the peninsula of Yucatan was such as to render its transfer to any European power an element of danger to our peace and security; and he declared that he had authentic information, that if the aid was not granted by the United States, it would probably be obtained

from some European power likely hereafter to assert a claim to "dominion and sovereignty" over Yucatan.

The United States was at that time at war with Mexico; and the President admitted that Yucatan had never declared her independence, but was treated by this country as a State of the Mexican Republic.[1]

A bill to enable the President to take temporary military occupation of Yucatan was immediately introduced in the Senate. In the discussion which followed, Mr. Calhoun took an active part, and as his speech is a limitation, if not a denial, of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine as generally understood, it deserves an extended notice.

Mr. Calhoun made the following points: —

1. The declaration of Mr. Monroe that the extension of the European political system to this country would be regarded as dangerous to our peace and safety referred only to the Allied Powers; and the events which called it forth have passed away forever.

2. The declaration of Mr. Monroe that European interposition in the affairs of the new Spanish-American republics would be regarded

[1] Congressional Globe, 30th Congress, 1st session.

as manifesting an unfriendly disposition toward the United States, also belongs to the history of that day. But suppose this not to be the case, there is no evidence of any interposition in the affairs of Yucatan on the part of England or any other European power with the design of oppressing her or changing her destiny. Should England interpose, it will not be as a *hostile* Power, but at the solicitation of Yucatan; and if she should assert her sovereignty, it would not bring the case within the declaration, because it would not be an interposition *to change the government and oppress the country.*

3. President Polk plainly rests his recommendation upon the declaration of Mr. Monroe that the continents of America are not henceforth to be considered as subjects of colonization by any European power. "Colonization" means the establishment of a settlement by emigrants from the parent country; this is the case of "surrendered sovereignty" over a people already there. Yucatan would thus become a province or a "possession" of Great Britain, but not a colony.

Mr. Calhoun then states his impression that this portion of the message originated with Mr. Adams, and never became a subject of delib-

eration in Mr. Monroe's cabinet.[1] It was inaccurate in stating that these continents have asserted and maintained their freedom, because as a *whole* such was not the case; and it was improper when viewed in conjunction with the declaration which preceded it, because we were acting in concert with England on a proposition coming from herself, and hence the declaration should have been in accordance with British feeling. As it was, it so offended her that she refused to co-operate with us in settling the Russian question.

Mr. Calhoun remarks that in stating the origin and character of these declarations he has discharged a duty to his country and, to use his own language, "a duty to the cabinet of which I was a member, and am now the only survivor."

4. The declarations of Mr. Monroe contain no reference to resistance.

5. The principle which lies at the bottom of President Polk's recommendation goes dangerously beyond Mr. Monroe's declaration. It puts it in the power of other countries on this continent to make us a party to all their wars.

6. Resistance to interposition, however, may

[1] See Mr. Plumer's statement, p. 36.

sometimes be necessary; but each case must be decided on its own merits. Interposition ought not to be allowed, for example, in the case of Cuba and of Texas; but Yucatan is a worthless country, and its possession would contribute nothing to the defence of the passage between it and Cuba. Besides, its military occupation would impose upon us a very heavy cost of both men and money, and probably bring us into conflict with England, and perhaps Spain also. Military possession would likewise be a breach of good faith with Mexico, with which country we have agreed upon the terms of a treaty.

7. Our only duty is to do for the white population of Yucatan all that humanity requires.[1]

The discussion soon ended, as news was received from Yucatan that the whites and Indians had settled their differences by treaty.

[1] Works, iv. p. 454.

CHAPTER V.

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL AND THE CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY.

THE main object of the early navigators of the Atlantic Ocean was the discovery of a more direct route to the East Indies. When Columbus first reached this continent he fondly believed that the dream of his life would be realized; and it was many years before a more accurate knowledge of this hemisphere forced the early explorers to abandon the long-cherished hope. Then the feasibility of severing the Isthmus by a canal, or of establishing some kind of communication across it, was suggested; and it is a fact that within the last three centuries and a half over forty projects have been advocated or entertained looking to the establishment of some kind of easy and permanent transit either across the Isthmus or the Central American Continent.[1]

[1] See The International Canal and the Monroe Doctrine, 1880, p. 115.

So early as 1825 attention in this country was directed to the subject; and ten years later, on March 3, 1835, a resolution was adopted by the Senate of the United States requesting the President to enter into negotiations with the Governments of other nations, and particularly with those of Central America and New Granada, for the purpose of protecting those who might attempt the opening of communication, and of securing the free navigation thereof. On Dec. 12, 1846, a treaty between this Government and that of New Granada (now the United States of Colombia) was signed, by Article XXXV. of which the Government of New Granada guaranteed to the Government of the United States "the right of way or transit across the Isthmus of Panama upon any modes of communication that now exist, or that may be hereafter constructed;" and the United States on its part guaranteed to the Government of New Granada the perfect neutrality of the Isthmus, and the rights of sovereignty and property of New Granada over the territory of the same.[1]

In 1849, the year following that in which our war with Mexico terminated, Mr. Hise, our representative in Guatemala, signed a treaty with

[1] Public Treaties, 1875, p. 558.

the Republic of Nicaragua, without instructions from this Government, by the terms of which Nicaragua granted to the United States an exclusive right of way across her territory for the construction of a canal; and the United States guaranteed to Nicaragua the protection of her territory and assured her of support in any war for its defence.

The relinquishment by Great Britain of all claim to the disputed territory west of the Rockies by the treaty of June 15, 1846, and the vast accessions to the territory of the United States consequent upon the termination of the war with Mexico by virtue of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of Feb. 2, 1848, demonstrated to this country the necessity of some kind of established Isthmian communication. But as the completion and successful operation of a water-way which should thus make possible the most direct communication by sea between Western Europe and the commercial centres of Asia was quite as likely to subserve the interests of Great Britain as those of the United States, it was natural that the former country should lay claim to a participation in the arrangements or stipulations which might be necessary before the prosecution of the work.

It seems that there had long dwelt upon the eastern shore of the Atlantic coast of the Isthmus a tribe of Indians called Mosquitoes, over whom Great Britain claimed to exercise some kind of protection. In the latter part of the seventeenth century a Spanish ship freighted with negroes was wrecked upon the coast; and, as they were saved, considerable negro blood was in time grafted upon the original Mosquito stock. These people were without laws or any kind of political organization; they had only a slight regard for the institution of marriage, and in instincts and habits were little superior to ordinary savages. The British claim was, that as the result of a friendship between the Mosquitoes and the early buccaneers these Indians sought and secured the protection of England about the middle of the seventeenth century, and that the British protectorate was never discontinued or renounced.

Differences arose between these Indians and the Republic of Nicaragua, and on Jan. 9, 1848, the Nicaraguans hoisted their flag in San Juan del Norte (called Grey Town), which was generally regarded as the necessary terminus of any railroad or canal across the Isthmus *within the territory of Nicaragua.* Only a few weeks after,

on February 2, the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo between this country and Mexico was signed, and immediately after, Great Britain espoused the cause of the Mosquitoes and forced the Nicaraguans to terms.

As the generality of Americans regarded the British protectorate of the Mosquitoes as a mere assumption, they viewed the seizure by Great Britain of the port of San Juan del Norte not only as an unjustifiable interference in the affairs of Nicaragua, but as an admission of regret upon her part that the valuable possessions of Mexico upon the Pacific coast should have been ceded to this country, and of fear that if she did not intervene, a canal might be constructed across the Isthmus with American money and under American protection and control. The relations between Great Britain and the United States soon began to assume a threatening aspect, and the signing of the treaty by Mr. Hise in the following year did not tend to harmonize the differences.

One of the first acts of President Taylor was the appointment of a diplomatic agent in Central America, who was instructed to look closely after the interests of this country. Soon after his arrival the British took forcible possession

of the islands in the Bay of Fonseca on the Pacific side, ostensibly to enforce claims for indemnity of British subjects against the States of Honduras and San Salvador; but in reality, as Americans believed, to call the attention of this country to the desirability of an agreement relative to the construction and operation of the proposed canal. At any rate, it was plain that delay might augment the misunderstanding and perhaps precipitate a conflict with Great Britain. The path was open to negotiation; and the mutual efforts of Mr. Clayton, then Secretary of State for this country, and of Sir Henry Bulwer, representing the Government of Great Britain, resulted in the treaty of April 19, 1850, known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, of which there have been the most varying interpretations, and over which there have been warm and protracted discussions.

The following is a synopsis of the treaty:[1]

The convention is stated to be for the purpose of setting forth and fixing the views and intentions of the two Governments, "with reference to any means of communication by ship-canal which may be constructed between the Atlantic

[1] See Public Treaties, 1875, p. 322.

and Pacific oceans by the way of the river San Juan de Nicaragua, and either or both of the lakes of Nicaragua or Managua, to any port or place on the Pacific Ocean."

ART. I. Neither Government "will ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship-canal;" nor erect or maintain any fortifications, "or occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America; nor make use of any protection which either affords or may afford, or any alliance which either has or may have to or with any State or people," for any of the above purposes, nor use any alliance or influence that either may possess with any State or Government through whose territory the canal may pass, for the purpose of acquiring for the citizens or subjects of the one any rights of commerce or navigation "which shall not be offered on the same terms to the citizens or subjects of the other."

ART. II. Vessels of both countries, in case of war between them, shall, while traversing the canal, or at such a distance from the two ends thereof as may hereafter be established, be exempted from blockade, detention, or capture.

ART. III. Those constructing the canal under the authority of the local Governments to be protected in person and property.

ART. IV. The contracting parties will use their influence with local Governments to facilitate the construction of the canal; and also their good offices to procure the establishment of two free ports.

ART. V. When completed, the contracting parties guarantee the protection and neutrality of the canal; which may be withdrawn by either party upon six months' notice to the other, if the regulations concerning traffic "are contrary to the spirit and intention of this convention."

ART. VI. The contracting parties engage to invite friendly States "to enter into stipulations with them similar to those which they have entered into with each other;" also to enter into treaty stipulations with the Central American States "for the purpose of more effectually carrying out the great design of this convention;" and also to use their good offices to settle differences between the States of Central America "as to right or property over the territory through which the said canal shall pass."

ART. VII. The contracting parties agree to

give their support to such reliable persons or company as may first offer to commence the construction of the canal; priority of claim to protection to belong to any person or company having made preparations therefor.

ART. VIII. Both Governments "agree to extend their protection, by treaty stipulations, to any other practicable communications, whether by canal or railway across the Isthmus," and especially to those "which are now proposed to be established by the way of Tehuantepec or Panama." Both Governments shall approve of the charges or conditions of traffic. Equal privileges shall be granted "to the citizens and subjects of every other State which is willing to grant thereto such protection as the United States and Great Britain engage to afford."

Not long after ratifications were exchanged, Great Britain put forth pretensions to dominion over certain territory which this Government maintained was covered by the terms of the treaty. The British claim to Honduras and the occupation by that Government of the Bay Islands were regarded by this country as plain violations of the treaty engagements. A discussion was opened between the two Governments,

which was prolonged for nearly a decade. The ambiguous passages in the treaty were subjected to rigid scrutiny; it was attempted to throw light upon the intentions of the contracting parties by reference to the opinions of the meaning of the treaty current at the time of its ratification, and Great Britain even proposed to submit the matter to the arbitrament of a friendly power. It is authentic that the United States Senate was largely influenced in its ratification by the supposition, if not the assurance, that the construction of the canal was not to be long delayed. This disagreement between the two Powers was an effectual obstacle to the commencement of the undertaking. However, in 1856 it was believed that a satisfactory settlement would be perfected. On the 17th of October of that year the Clarendon-Dallas treaty, with separate articles, was signed by the terms of which the Mosquito question and other differences as to dominion over Central American territory were set at rest. This treaty was ratified by the Senate with the addition of certain amendments, in which, however, the British Government declined to concur; so that the relative position of the contracting parties remained unchanged.

The discussion was at once resumed, but in 1859 and 1860 the British Government signed certain treaties with three of the Central American Governments, by the terms of which the former so renounced or modified its claims to Central American territory as to at least pacify the Government of the United States. These were as follows : —

1. Convention with the Republic of Guatemala relative to the boundary of British Honduras, signed April 30, 1859.

2. Treaty with the Republic of Honduras respecting the Bay Islands, the Mosquito Indians, etc., signed Nov. 28, 1859.

In this treaty Great Britain recognized "as belonging to and under the sovereignty of the Republic of Honduras the country hitherto occupied or possessed by the Mosquito Indians;" and the Republic agreed to grant money for their education.

3. Convention with the Republic of Nicaragua relative to the Mosquito Indians, signed Jan. 28, 1860.

It was agreed that a district within the territory of the Republic of Nicaragua should be assigned to the Mosquito Indians, and that the port of Grey Town, or San Juan del Norte,

should be a free port under the sovereign authority of the Republic.[1]

During the American Civil War the project of Isthmian transit was allowed to slumber; but on June 21, 1867, the Governments of the United States and of the Republic of Nicaragua concluded a treaty, by the terms of which the former was granted the most liberal rights of transit between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans through the territory of the latter; and while the United States guaranteed the neutrality and innocent use of the same, it was agreed that the Government of that country might employ military forces for the protection of persons and property, if the Government of Nicaragua failed so to do, when such employment was necessary. The treaty was to remain in force for fifteen years, either party to give the other twelve months' notice before the expiration of that period of its intention to terminate or alter the treaty; and, in default of such notice, the

[1] For these three treaties see British "Accounts and Papers," lxviii.

These treaties seem to have set the vexed Mosquito question at rest. The Mosquito Indians were apparently fast deteriorating, and a number of years before, on March 9, 1853, Mr. Clayton remarked in the United States Senate that there were not more than five hundred of them in existence, and that they were rapidly disappearing from the earth.

treaty to remain in force until twelve months from the day on which either party should notify the other of its intention to abrogate or alter the same.[1]

Another decade elapsed, and still no work was begun; but on May 15, 1879, there was held at Paris, at the call and under the direction of no less a personage than Ferdinand de Lesseps, an "Interoceanic Canal Congress," to which this Government deemed it advisable to send two representatives. These were instructed not to commit their Government to the choice of any particular route for a canal, or to offer aid in its construction. Their reception was not a courteous one, and the cause has been ascribed to the fact that the meeting was composed largely of penniless adherents of Napoleon III., who were now anxious to repair the fortunes which had been shattered during the ineffectual attempt of that ruler to force a monarchy upon Mexico.

The deliberations of this Congress pointed unmistakably to the early construction of a canal which has since been undertaken by way of Panama, and not through Nicaragua. The announcement of this project created some dis-

[1] See Public Treaties, 1875, p. 566, Arts. XIV., XV., XX.

turbance of popular feeling in this country; and soon after, on June 25th of the same year, Mr. Burnside introduced the following resolution in the Senate of the United States: —

"Whereas, the people of this Union have for upwards of fifty years adhered to the doctrine asserted by President Monroe 'as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future' occupation 'by any European power;' Therefore,

"*Resolved*, That the people of these States would not view, without serious inquietude, any attempt by the Powers of Europe to establish under their protection and domination a ship-canal across the Isthmus of Darien; and such action on the part of any European power could not be regarded 'in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States.'"

The resolution was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Several resolutions were afterward introduced in the National House of Representatives, reasserting the Monroe Doctrine as a cardinal principle in our national polity, and declaring

that any Isthmian canal by whomsoever constructed must be under the protection of the United States. Of these the most conspicuous, introduced by Mr. Crapo of Massachusetts in December, 1880, was as follows: —

"*Resolved*, That the construction of an interoceanic canal connecting the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans by means of foreign capital under the auspices of or through a charter from any European Government, is hostile to the established policy of the United States, is in violation of the spirit and declaration of the Monroe Doctrine, and cannot be sanctioned or assented to by this Government; that the United States will assert and maintain such control and supervision over any interoceanic canal as may be necessary to protect its national interests and means of defence, unity, and safety, and to advance the prosperity and augment the commerce of the Atlantic and Pacific States of the Union."

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom this resolution was referred, gave the subject prolonged attention, and finally made a report in which they heartily sustained the resolution; but the session closed without the adoption of the report.

President Hayes, in transmitting to the Senate on March 9, 1880, copies of correspondence

and other papers relative to a ship-canal across the Isthmus, expressed the following views: —

1. The policy of this country is a canal under American control. If existing treaties or the rights of sovereignty or property of other nations stand in the way of this policy, negotiations should be entered into to establish the American policy consistently with the rights of the nations to be affected by it.

2. The capital invested in the enterprise must look for protection to one or more of the great powers of the world. No European power can be allowed to intervene for such protection. The United States "must exercise such control as will enable this country to protect its national interests and maintain the rights of those whose private capital is embarked in the work."

3. Such a canal would virtually be "a part of the coast line of the United States;" and its relations to this country "are matters of paramount concern to the people of the United States. No other great power would, under similar circumstances, fail to assert a rightful control over a work so closely and vitally affecting its interest and welfare." [1]

[1] See Congressional Record, vol. x. p. 1399.

At the time of the inauguration of President Garfield the construction of the proposed canal by foreign capitalists without an understanding as to an American protectorate was still viewed with great concern. In his inaugural the President said: "We shall urge no narrow policy, nor seek peculiar or exclusive privileges in any commercial route; but, in the language of my predecessor, I believe it to be 'the right and duty of the United States to assert and maintain such supervision and authority over any inter-oceanic canal across the Isthmus that connects North and South America as will protect our national interests.'"

It is probable that the interests of the United States relative to the undertaking of M. de Lesseps received early attention in the cabinet of President Garfield, for the first communication [1] of Mr. Blaine, Secretary of State, to Mr. Lowell, our Minister to Great Britain, bears the early date of June 24, 1881. After referring to the reports current as to a guarantee of the neutrality of the proposed canal on the part of European powers, Mr. Blaine states the position of

[1] Most of the correspondence on this subject hereinafter referred to is given in British "Accounts and Papers," lxxx., and all of it in "Foreign Relations," 1881, 1882, and 1883.

the United States in language substantially as follows: —

1. The United States recognizes a proper guarantee of neutrality as essential; and this has already been provided for by our treaty of 1846 with the Republic of New Granada.

2. The United States will not interfere with the enterprise as a commercial one; but its political control must be in the hands of this country.

The United States does not desire exclusive privileges accorded American ships in time of peace; but "the possessions of the United States upon the Pacific coast are imperial in extent and of extraordinary growth." They would supply the larger part of the traffic through the canal, and it is this domestic function which has caused the project to be regarded as of vital importance by this Government.

3. An agreement between the powers of Europe to jointly guarantee the neutrality and in effect control the political character of the canal would be viewed by this Government with the gravest concern.

4. The United States has never offered to take part in agreements in which European powers have united, such as guarantees of

neutrality touching the political condition of certain European States; and it is the long-settled conviction of this Government that any extension to our shores of the political system of Europe "would be attended with danger to the peace and welfare of this nation."

5. The position of the United States "is nothing more than the pronounced adherence of the United States to principles long since enunciated by the highest authority of the Government, and now, in the judgment of the President, firmly inwoven as an integral and important part of our national policy."

Earl Granville replied to Mr. Hoppin, Secretary of Legation, Nov. 10, 1881, acknowledging receipt of a copy of Mr. Blaine's despatch to Mr. Lowell, and stating that the position of Great Britain was determined by the provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.

To this statement Mr. Blaine replied in his letter to Mr. Lowell of Nov. 19, 1881. The following is a summary of his views: —

1. The Clayton-Bulwer convention was made more than thirty years ago, under conditions which "were temporary in their nature and which can never be reproduced." The remarkable development of the United States

on the Pacific coast since that time has created duties for the Government, the discharge of which requires some modifications in the treaty.

2. "The operation of the treaty practically concedes to Great Britain the control of whatever canal may be constructed." It is incumbent upon Great Britain, with its extended colonial possessions, "to maintain a vast naval establishment, which in our continental solidity we do not need." Hence if the United States binds itself not to fortify on land, Great Britain would have an advantage which would prove decisive in the possible case of struggle for the control of the canal.

3. The treaty binds the United States not to use its military force in any precautionary measure, while it leaves the naval power of Great Britain perfectly free and unrestrained. If no American soldier is to be quartered on the Isthmus, no war vessel of Great Britain should be allowed in the waters controlling either entrance to the canal.

4. "This Government, with respect to European States, will not consent to perpetuate any treaty that impeaches our rightful and long-established claim to priority on the American

continent." The United States seeks to defend its interests as Great Britain defends hers. It would be as reasonable for the United States to demand a share in the fortifications by which Great Britain excludes all other powers from the waters of the Red Sea and thus virtually controls the Suez Canal, or to demand their neutralization, as for England to make the same demand in perpetuity from the United States with respect to the transit across the American continent.

5. The possessions of the United States upon the Pacific Ocean are now of vast extent. The money value of their surplus for export will in the near future "be as large as that of British India, and perhaps larger." India is a distant colony, but "the region on the Pacific is an integral portion of our National Union." The inhabitants of the former "are alien from England in race, language, and religion; the citizens of the latter are of our own blood and kindred." Great Britain cannot therefore object to the United States adopting measures "for holding absolute control of the great water-way which shall unite the two oceans, and which the United States will always insist upon treating as part of her coast line."

6. By the supervision of the United States alone can the canal be secured against the obstruction incident to war. The United States is least likely of all Governments to be engaged in war; so that while for self-protection she asserts her right to control the canal, she also offers its absolute neutralization as respects European powers.

7. Other leading nations since 1850 have greatly enlarged their commercial connections with Central America. The canal scheme now projected finds a national sponsor in the Republic of France, and non-intervention on the part of the United States would paralyze its arm in any attempt to assert the plain rights and privileges which the Government acquired through its treaty with the Republic of Colombia.

8. One of the motives which induced the Government to assent to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, plainly inferable from every line of it, was the expected aid of British capital. That expectation has not been realized. The changed condition of this country since 1850 has diminished any advantage to be derived from that source. The resources of our own Government and people are sufficient to construct it. Foreign

capital cannot enter as an essential factor into the determination of this problem.

9. Mr. Blaine then proposes a modification of the treaty in five particulars: —

(1) Every part which forbids the United States fortifying the canal and holding the political control of it in conjunction with the country in which it is located, to be cancelled.

(2) Every part in which Great Britain and the United States agree to make no acquisition of territory in Central America, to remain in full force.

(3) No objection to maintaining the clause looking to the establishment of a free port at each end of the proposed canal.

(4) The clause to the effect that treaty stipulations should be made for a joint protectorate of any railway or canal never having been perfected, to be regarded as obsolete.

(5) The distance from either end of the canal where, in time of war, captures might be made, to be as liberal as possible.

10. The United States will act in entire harmony with the Governments within whose territory the canal shall be located; and it shall be used only for the development and increase of peaceful commerce among all nations.

In a communication to Mr. Lowell dated Nov. 29, 1881, Mr. Blaine refers to the early dissatisfaction with the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and to the differences of interpretation of the same. After referring to the attempt to adjust all differences by the ineffectual Clarendon-Dallas treaty negotiated on the 17th of October, 1856, he makes copious extracts from the communications of General Cass, Secretary of State under President Buchanan, and of Lord Napier the British Representative, looking to a modification of the treaty, as "it was frankly admitted on both sides that the engagements of the treaty were misunderstandingly entered into, imperfectly comprehended, contradictorily interpreted, and mutually vexatious." That these last communications of Mr. Blaine to Mr. Lowell had the sanction of President Arthur, is presumed from the reference to the subject in his first message to Congress, shortly after those communications were sent.[1] After referring to the treaty of 1846 with Colombia, he states that he has supplemented the action of his predecessor "by proposing to her Majesty's Government the modification of that instrument [that is, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty], and the abrogation of

[1] See President Arthur's Message, Dec. 6, 1881.

such claims thereof as do not comport with the obligations of the United States toward Colombia, or with the vital needs of the two friendly parties to the compact."

Earl Granville's answer to Mr. Blaine's letter to Mr. Lowell of Nov. 19, 1881, is contained in his communication to Mr. West, the British Minister at Washington, bearing date of Jan. 7, 1882. Earl Granville thinks that the principles upon which the argument of Mr. Blaine is founded are novel in international law. He denies any analogy as to the Suez Canal, and questions Mr. Blaine's statements as to that canal as practically and historically incorrect. He thinks that the development of the United States on the Pacific coast was within the view of the statesmen who were parties to the treaty of 1850. Great Britain's colonial possessions upon the Pacific coast have also greatly developed since the treaty was signed. Great Britain desires the security on a general international basis of the universal and unrestrained use of the canal. The fortifications by one power would be followed by those of another. If the United States insists on treating the water-way which shall unite the two oceans "as part of

her coast line," intermediate States will certainly become less independent than at present.

To Mr. Blaine's letter of Nov. 29, 1881, to Mr. Lowell, Earl Granville replies in his communication of Jan. 14, 1882, to Mr. West. He quotes freely from despatches relating to the controversy between the Governments which was carried on from 1856 to 1860, and makes an ingenious and able argument. He declares that Mr. Blaine's account of negotiations ends at a point where the most important episode commences; namely, that in 1859 and in 1860 treaties were concluded between Great Britain separately with Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua in settlement of all questions relating to Central American differences, and that President Buchanan, in his message to Congress of Dec. 3, 1860, said that the discordant constructions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty "have resulted in a final settlement entirely satisfactory to this Government." Earl Granville concludes by saying, "I have been forced to give the above extracts at considerable length, and I refrain from adding other passages which would tend to illustrate and confirm them." A perusal of them, he thinks, will suffice to show certain points which are briefly as follows: —

1. That the differences between the two Governments simply had their origin in a stipulation which Mr. Blaine still proposes in great part to maintain.

2. That the declarations of the United States Government during the controversy were distinctly at variance with any such proposal as that just stated.

3. That at a time when the British Government had been induced by the long continuance of the controversy to contemplate the abrogation of the treaty, they were only willing to do so on the condition of reverting to the *status quo ante* its conclusion in 1850; a solution which was at that time possible — though, as the United States Government justly pointed out, it would have been fraught with great danger to the good relations between the two countries — but which is now rendered impossible by the subsequent events.

4. That a conclusion was effected by the voluntary action of Great Britain. She practically conceded the points in dispute, and President Buchanan, as stated above, declared the settlement entirely satisfactory to his Government.

Mr. Frelinghuysen, who succeeded Mr. Blaine as Secretary of State, transmitted to Mr. Lowell,

on May 8, 1882, a communication of which the following may be regarded as a synopsis : —

A protectorate of the United States and of the republic whose territory the canal may cross only required. A protectorate by European nations would be in conflict with the Monroe Doctrine, which "is cherished by the American people, and has been approved by the Government of Great Britain." Great Britain exercises dominion over Balize, or British Honduras, and the impression prevails that since 1850 the English inhabitants of that district have spread into the territory of the neighboring republics. Both countries have not the right to exercise dominion over or to colonize one foot of territory in Central America. If Great Britain has violated and continues to violate that provision, the treaty is voidable at the pleasure of the United States.

President Buchanan, in his message of Dec. 3, 1860, referred to the dispossession of Great Britain of the occupation of one end of the Nicaragua route, and not to the colonization of British Honduras. Mr. Frelinghuysen narrates how the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was entered into, and shows that the object was to insure at the earliest possible moment the

completion of the canal. Steps were taken, but the project failed. The canal now in question is on the Panama, and not on the Nicaragua route. Article VIII. of the treaty relates to transit other than by the Nicaragua route. But the United States entered into the treaty of 1846 with New Granada, which is still in force. Article VIII. relates only to those projects *now* proposed to be established, and contemplates further "treaty stipulation" before Great Britain can join the United States in the protectorate of the canal by the Panama route.

Earl Granville's reply was to Mr. West, dated Dec. 30, 1882: —

1. He cannot agree with Mr. Frelinghuysen as to the meaning of Article VIII. of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.

2. He claims that the United States cannot abrogate that treaty by reason of the existence of things which has prevailed, to their knowledge, before as well as since its ratification, to which the treaty was never intended to apply, and notwithstanding the known existence of which they have more than once recognized the treaty as subsisting.

3. He does not think, as Mr. Frelinghuysen

suggests, that any necessity exists for a fresh agreement between the two countries having for its object the retention and renewal of certain provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.

In his communication of May 5, 1883, to Mr. Lowell, Mr. Frelinghuysen replied to Lord Granville's communication of Dec. 30, 1882. After reiterating his former views, he remarks: "In the conviction, therefore, that the arguments heretofore presented by the United States remain unshaken, the President adheres to the views set forth in the instruction to you of May 8, 1882."

Lord Granville replied Aug. 17, 1883, reiterating his former views, and stating not only that the Monroe Doctrine was not adhered to by all of Mr. Monroe's successors, but that the mere fact that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was entered into by the two Governments to *jointly* protect the communication which might be made between the two oceans is a sufficient answer to the statement that that doctrine is applicable to the case.

Mr. Frelinghuysen briefly replied in a letter to Mr. Lowell bearing date Nov. 22, 1883.

In concluding this subject, it should be observed that there is very little question but

that Mr. Clayton intended, in negotiating the treaty of 1850, to disregard the Monroe Doctrine as in any sense binding. Such was his own avowal when, on becoming a member of the United States Senate only a few years after, he was drawn into a bitter and protracted discussion with General Cass of Michigan as to the origin and meaning of the treaty and as to the intentions of the contracting parties. However, it has been ever since maintained by American statesmen that a departure in one instance from the spirit and letter of President Monroe's declaration is in no sense its abandonment as a national doctrine.

The discussions and writings to which the Clayton-Bulwer treaty has given rise would fill volumes; but it is fair to say that for many years there has been a growing conviction among conservative Americans that an occasion is offered for the application of the principle of international law, — that when the circumstances which accompany the negotiation of a treaty have changed, and the movements in population and wealth have made it necessary, either party has a right to avoid the treaty, provided the other refuses to agree to appropriate modifications.

On Feb. 12, 1856, Mr. Wilson of Massachusetts, in a speech in the United States Senate, expressed the following sentiments: —

"The only way, in my judgment, to get out of our present embarrassment is to declare the Clayton-Bulwer treaty null and void, — to negotiate in Central America for the protection of our transit routes across that country. It is the policy which will, in my judgment, promote the future peace and interest of the country. I would vote against the Clayton-Bulwer treaty if it were before us to-day; for I can never agree to make an arrangement with England or any other foreign Power that we will not exercise dominion over any portion of this continent."[1]

In urging upon Lord Granville their reasons why a modification of the treaty was both desirable and necessary, it is probable that both Secretaries Blaine and Frelinghuysen bore in mind not only the rule of international law just referred to, but the striking example of the modification of a treaty in recent times; an allusion to which may appropriately close the chapter.[2]

By the treaty of Paris, March, 1856, which terminated the Crimean War, it was agreed that

[1] Congressional Globe, 34th Congress, 1st session; Appendix.

[2] See Annual Cyclopædia, 1870, p. 257; 1871, p. 275. Hertslet's Map of Europe by Treaty, iii. 1904–1924.

the Black Sea should be neutralized. In October, 1870, Prince Gortschakoff called upon Lord Granville for modifications of the treaty, assigning as a cause that certain Powers had been guilty of infractions thereof; "in presence of which," he said, "it would be difficult to affirm that written law, founded upon respect for treaties as a base of public law and rule for the relations between States, has preserved the same moral sanction which it may have had in other times."

In a communication in the following month of November, the Prince said: "Earl Granville will agree that the Europe of to-day is very far from being the Europe which signed the treaty of 1856. It was impossible that Russia should agree to remain the only Power bound indefinitely to an arrangement which, onerous as it was at the time when it was concluded, became daily weaker in its guarantees."

It is fair to remark that in the following year an agreement was arrived at by several of the Powers, that no party is at liberty to abolish a treaty or withdraw from it without the consent of all parties in interest. This gave Great Britain an opportunity to gracefully yield to the demands of her adversary, and a treaty was signed by the

great Powers in the early part of 1871, modifying the treaty of 1856, and thus practically granting all the concessions which Russia desired.[1]

[1] The construction of the proposed water-way is at present a subject of great popular interest. There is little probability that M. de Lesseps' canal at Panama will be completed for several years, if at all. A vast sum of money has been already expended, and only a beginning has been made. But as Colombia is in a constant state of insurrection and bankruptcy, the fear of Americans is that it would "be easy for the French at an opportune moment to make an issue with the local authorities; the home Government would be called upon to protect its subjects, and in such a case there is no reason to believe that it would not try to realize, if it could, the dream of French statesmen as to the rôle of France in countries of Latin origin." See the Nation, vol. xxx. p. 90. In this connection the words of M. de Lesseps himself in the North American Review, vol. cxxx. p. 12, may be of some interest: "The Monroe Doctrine, so far from being opposed to our enterprise, is directly favorable to it, inasmuch as it is the Republic of the United States of Colombia which has granted the concession for the Panama Canal; and the decree of the President of the United States of Colombia, of the 3d of September, 1879, as well as the letter of the Governor of Panama, which informed me of that decree, very plainly signify that the nations of that part of America are heartily enlisted in the undertaking."

In regard to Nicaragua, the intention of intersecting that country is still entertained, and a treaty between the Governments of Nicaragua and the United States, giving the latter the most liberal rights over a water-way through the territory of the former, failed of ratification in the United States Senate Jan. 29, 1885; but an amendment looking to the abrogation or modification of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was adopted.

For an able discussion of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty from an English stand-point, see "Some Disputed Questions in International Law," by T. J. Laurence, recently published.

CHAPTER VI.

CUBA.

The history of Cuba is the history of political disturbance. This is especially true of the island since the deposition of the royal family of Spain by Napoleon I., in the early part of this century. Cuba remained loyal to the Spanish crown, and has ever since been in the hands of successive Captain-Generals, who have been sent out from Spain armed with authority almost unlimited. The antagonism between these rulers and the native Cubans has been intense; the latter of whom the Spanish crown has in vain endeavored to subjugate or suppress.

Cuba is not only rich in resources, but a glance at the map will show that she commands the approaches to a large portion of our national frontier. It is plain, also, that any increased facility of Isthmian transit, such as a successfully operated canal, must result in placing the commerce benefited thereby more or less under the

supervision of the fleets which find a haven in her numerous harbors.

After the cession to the United States by France of Louisiana in 1803, and more particularly by Spain of Florida in 1819, Cuba was naturally regarded by many Americans as a probable, if not necessary, acquisition by this country. But Spain was loath to part with so valuable a possession, even though it was the theatre of constant insurrection and warfare; and England seconded her in her resolution, because she apprehended that the transfer of that island to the United States would to a certain extent jeopardize the commercial interests of Great Britain, especially in the event of the completion and operation of an interoceanic canal.

The separation of the Spanish-American colonies from the mother country was the admitted failure of Spanish colonial policy. It was natural, therefore, to suppose that the true development of the resources of Cuba would be impossible under Spanish dominion. Hence the apparently well-grounded apprehension of eminent Americans that England or some other European power contemplated the acquisition of that island, or its government under a European

protectorate, with the real design of protecting European shipping which might eventually pass through the contemplated canal.

Mr. Clay, while Secretary of State, in a communication to Mr. Brown, the American Minister to France, dated Oct. 25, 1825, referred to the fact that in the preceding summer "a large French fleet visited the American seas and the coast of the United States;" and stated "that the purpose of any similar movement, hereafter, made in a season of peace, should be communicated to this Government."

In regard to the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, he said: —

"The views of the Executive of the United States in regard to them have been already disclosed to France by you, on the occasion of inviting its co-operation to bring about a peace between Spain and her former colonies, in a spirit of great frankness. It was stated to the French Government that the United States could not see, with indifference, these islands passing from Spain to any other European power; and that, for ourselves, no change was desired in their present political and commercial condition, nor in the possession which Spain has of them. In the same spirit, and with the hope of guarding, beforehand, against any possible difficulties on that subject that may arise, you will now add that we

could not consent to the occupation of those islands by any other European power than Spain, under any contingency whatever. Cherishing no designs on them ourselves, we have a fair claim to an unreserved knowledge of the views of other great maritime Powers in respect to them."[1]

In regard to the fleet whose presence in the American seas so disturbed the Government of the United States, the French Government replied that its purpose was to look out for French interests to the south of this country; and in regard to the attitude of France toward Cuba, Mr. Clay was assured that there was an entire concurrence by the French Government in the views expressed by him.

But this did not wholly allay apprehension. There was still entertained in this country a general hostility to any suggestion of the possession of Cuba by any European power except Spain; and those who entertained it found a ready exponent in Mr. Webster, in his speech in the House of Representatives in April, 1826, on the Panama Mission,[2] and also in Mr. Calhoun, in his speech in the Senate on May 15, 1848, on the Proposed Occupation of Yucatan; the

[1] British and Foreign State Papers, 1825, 1826, p. 425.

[2] See page 32.

latter of whom used the following emphatic language : —

" So long as Cuba remains in the hands of Spain, — a friendly Power, a Power of which we have no dread, — it should continue to be, as it has been, the policy of all administrations ever since I have been connected with the Government, to let Cuba remain there ; but with the fixed determination, which I hope never will be relinquished, that if Cuba pass from her, it shall not be into any other hands but ours." [1]

The acquisition of that island seemed so desirable to President Polk, that in 1848 he directed our Minister at Madrid to ascertain if Spain was willing to transfer the same to the United States for a liberal compensation ; but the Minister of State replied " that he believed such to be the feeling of the country that, sooner than see the island transferred to any Power, they would prefer seeing it sunk in the ocean."

In 1849 an adventurer named Narcisco Lopez made preparations in this country, with the design of attacking the island of Cuba ; but his expedition was defeated by the vigilance of the Government of the United States. He

[1] See page 39.

subsequently managed, however, to elude the United States authorities; as two more expeditions fitted out by him, one in 1850 and the other in 1851, were successful so far as a landing on the island was concerned, although otherwise abortive. The popular uprising upon which Lopez had built his hopes of the success of his last adventure did not occur; his forces were routed, and he himself was captured and executed.

The intelligence of these events produced a profound sensation in Europe, and the Governments of Great Britain and France were at once aroused. Louis Napoleon was now President of the French Republic; and it is probable that both he and his English ally not only viewed with alarm the extension of our national territory which followed the successful issue of the war with Mexico, but apprehended that these spasmodic forays of Lopez were only precursors of an organized effort on the part of this Government for the seizure and annexation of Cuba.

Accordingly, early in 1852, when Mr. Fillmore was President and Mr. Webster Secretary of State, the two Governments of Great Britain and France resorted to the novel, and in the

judgment of many Americans the impertinent, procedure of proposing to the Government of the United States that the three Governments should enter into a certain tripartite arrangement relative to Cuba, which is so unusual that we give it entire.[1]

Preamble.

Her Majesty, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Prince President of the French Republic, and the United States of America, having judged it expedient, with a view to strengthen the friendly relations which happily subsist between them, to set forth and fix, by a convention, their views and intentions with regard to the island of Cuba, have named as their respective plenipotentiaries for that purpose; that is to say, —

Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, etc.,

The Prince President of the French Republic, etc.,

And the President of the United States of America, etc.,

Who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following articles: —

[1] Correspondence on the Proposed Tripartite Convention relative to Cuba, p. 13.

ART. I. The high contracting parties hereby severally and collectively disclaim, both now and for hereafter, all intention to obtain possession of the island of Cuba; and they respectively bind themselves to discountenance all attempt to that effect on the part of any Power or individuals whatever.

The high contracting parties declare, severally and collectively, that they will not obtain or maintain, for themselves, or for any one of themselves, any exclusive control over the said island, nor assume nor exercise any dominion over the same.

ART. II. The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratification shall be exchanged at ——, as soon as possible within —— months from the date thereof.

In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at Washington, the —— day of ——, in the year of our Lord 1852.

It will thus be observed that the two foreign Governments were so considerate as to present to the United States a form of a treaty which needed only the signatures of the respective plenipotentiaries and the exchange of ratifications, to give it the character of a perpetual obligation.

The Earl of Malmesbury, in his letter[1] of April 8, 1852, to Mr. Crampton, the British Minister at Washington, remarked that as the Government of the United States had "repeatedly declared that it would not see with indifference the island of Cuba fall into the possession of any other European power than Spain," so her Majesty's Government "could never see with indifference the island of Cuba in the possession of any Power whatever but Spain."

In his letter to Mr. Webster of July 8, 1852, Mr. Crampton stated the true motive of the Allied Powers when he said that the nation possessing Cuba *might either protect or obstruct the commercial routes from one ocean to the other;* although he added that Spain was put to great expense in keeping an armed force in Cuba, and that, relieved of the apprehension which was the cause of these armaments (namely, anticipated expeditions from the United States, like those of Lopez), she could more easily meet her engagements to her French and English creditors. He was also of opinion that a stipulation like the foregoing would be an induce-

[1] The communications on this subject hereinafter referred to will be found in "Correspondence on the Proposed Tripartite Convention relative to Cuba."

ment to her to lower her tariff at Havana, the high rates of which were a subject of complaint in the United States.

Mr. Everett was Mr. Webster's successor as Secretary of State. In a communication to the Comte de Sartiges, dated Dec. 1, 1852, he stated with remarkable clearness and power the reasons of the declination of the President to enter into the tripartite arrangement.

They were substantially as follows: —

1. The President fully concurs with his predecessors "that the United States could not see with indifference the island of Cuba fall into the possession of any other European Government than Spain." The President does not covet the acquisition of Cuba for the United States; at the same time he considers the condition of Cuba as mainly an American question.

2. The convention proposed would be viewed with disfavor by the United States Senate.

3. It is doubtful whether the Constitution of the United States would allow the treaty-making Power to impose a permanent disability on the American Government.

4. Among the oldest traditions of the Federal Government is an aversion to political alliances with European powers.

5. The compact, although equal in its terms, would be very unequal in substance. France and England, by entering into it, would disable themselves from obtaining possession of an island remote from their seats of government, belonging to another European power, while the United States would disable themselves from making an acquisition which might take place without any disturbance of existing foreign relations, and in the natural order of things. The island of Cuba lies at our doors. It commands the approach to the Gulf of Mexico, which washes the shores of five of our States. It bars the entrance of that great river which drains half the North American continent, and, with its tributaries, forms the largest system of internal water communication in the world. *It keeps watch at the doorway of our intercourse with California by the Isthmus route.*

But any designs against Cuba on the part of this Government are emphatically disclaimed; and the President has given ample proof of the sincerity with which he holds these views by throwing the whole force of his constitutional power against all illegal attacks upon the island.

6. The proposed convention would be a tran-

sitory arrangement, sure to be swept away by the irresistible tide of affairs in a new country. (To illustrate this Mr. Everett refers to the comparative history of Europe and America during the preceding century. His enlargement upon the material development of this country is extremely graphic and powerful.)

7. The conclusion of the proposed treaty would not put an end to the attacks made upon Cuba by lawless bands of adventurers from the United States, as claimed by the British Government, but would give a new impulse to them. It would strike a death-blow to the conservative policy hitherto pursued in this country toward Cuba, and would accomplish the overthrow of the administration entering into it.

The communication, of which the above is an abstract, is regarded by many as one of the ablest of American State papers. Lord John Russell, who succeeded the Earl of Malmesbury in the British foreign office, seems to have been offended by Mr. Everett's glowing picture of our national expansion; for he declared in a communication to Mr. Crampton dated Feb. 16, 1853, that there was no occasion for Mr. Everett to refer to events with which the two foreign

Governments were already familiar. This letter was sent after Mr. Everett's retirement from the Department of State, but he felt that it was his duty to answer it as a private individual. His reply, dated at Boston on the 17th of the following September, is an able vindication of the arguments contained in his communication in the preceding December.

With the falling through of the tripartite arrangement, our relations with Spain grew less friendly than ever. The Cuban authorities manifested an officious vigilance in subjecting American citizens to frequent acts of annoyance and injury, and in interfering with American commerce. This invasion of our national rights culminated in the seizure by the Cuban authorities of the American steamer the "Black Warrior," in the latter part of February, 1854. Deeming the purchase of the island by the Government of the United States as the only means of preventing the recurrence of such acts of violence, President Pierce sent directions to Mr. Soulé, the American Minister at Madrid, to meet Messrs. Buchanan and Mason, our ministers respectively to Great Britain and France, "for a full and free inter-

change of views in order to secure a concurrence in reference to the general object." [1]

The three ministers met at Ostend on Oct. 9, 1854, and drew up a paper known as the Ostend Manifesto, in which they arrived at the conclusion that an immediate "effort ought to be made by the Government of the United States to purchase Cuba from Spain at any price for which it can be obtained, not exceeding the sum of $——." It was in their opinion advisable that the proposal should be presented through the necessary diplomatic forms to the Cortes about to assemble. However, when the question came up for discussion in that body not many weeks after, the declaration of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that in his judgment "to part with Cuba would be to part with the national honor," was not only frantically applauded in the galleries, but received the sanction of the house.

In the session of 1858–1859 of the United States Senate a bill was introduced by Mr. Slidell, of Louisiana, providing for the placing of the sum of thirty million dollars in the hands of the President, with a view to the acquisition

[1] See Executive Documents, 2d Session, 33d Congress.

[2] Ibid.

of Cuba. An animated and protracted discussion ensued; but the bill was eventually withdrawn by its author.[1]

[1] The subsequent differences between the United States and the Cuban authorities have not called for the application of the Monroe Doctrine ; but it is worthy of note that a reciprocity treaty between this country and Spain, with twenty-eight articles and three comprehensive tariff schedules, has just been signed, and is now (Jan. 29, 1885) before the United States Senate for ratification or rejection.

CHAPTER VII.

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO.

The release of Mexico from the dominion of Spain in 1821 brought the former country more than ever under the tyrannical rule of the Church. A Liberal party, however, soon sprang up; and the antagonisms of these two parties — the Church and the Liberal — gave rise in thirty-three years to thirty-six different forms of government. From 1857 to 1861 the political condition of Mexico was peculiarly disturbed. The triumph of the Liberal party in 1857 resulted in the establishment of a constitutional federal government. The Church party soon set aside this constitution and maintained a tottering government, which fell when President Miramon was defeated by the Liberal army under Juarez, on the 17th of November, 1860.

It should be borne in mind that during these three years of discord the constitutional government under Juarez continued to exist, although the Diplomatic Corps recognized

the insurrectionary party as the Government *de facto*.

Certain enormities, most of which were committed by the Church party prior to the victory of Juarez, were regarded by the creditor Governments of Great Britain, Spain, and France as sufficient to justify an armed intervention in Mexican affairs.

These, for convenience, may be stated as follows : —

1. The claim of England.

In obedience to the orders of Miramon, whose party was in pecuniary embarrassment, a party of armed men broke into the house of the British legation on Nov. 16, 1860, and against the protest of the Spanish Minister, who happened to be present, and in spite of the English flag and the seals of the office, rifled the safes of £152,000 sterling, belonging to English bondholders, deposited there for safe keeping.

In this connection it is important to note that a writer in Fraser's Magazine of December, 1861, states that prior to the date of foreign intervention grave complaints were made by Mexicans that merchants, in order to elude payment of the high rate of duty on the exportation of silver connived, with British officers, who, for a

compensation, secreted upon their persons and carried upon board the war-ships of England great loads of the precious metal. Hence he concludes that the Mexican generals, "in attacking the British consulates, were probably actuated rather by a rude theory of their own on the subject of justifiable reprisal, than by a mere senseless hostility to foreigners or rapacious desire for plunder."

The above, however, was England's principal cause of complaint; although she also claimed that Marquez, the coadjutor of Miramon, on the 8th of April, 1859, murdered, among others, a surgeon who was either an English subject or of English descent.

2. The claim of Spain.

In September, 1859, the insurrectionary party concluded a treaty with Spain, known as the Mon-Almonte treaty, which recognized the validity of certain claims denied by the constitutional government. Upon the triumph of Juarez the latter government disavowed the treaty.

This was Spain's cardinal ground of complaint, although she was also aggrieved at the summary dismissal by Juarez of M. Pacheco, the Spanish Ambassador.

3. The claim of France.

Jecker, an embarrassed Swiss banker, and Miramon designed a means of mutual enrichment, which was formulated on the 29th of October, 1859, in a decree in the name of the insurrectionary administration creating an issue of bonds to the amount of $15,000,000, which was only calculated to raise the comparatively paltry sum of $750,000. Without entering into the details of this financial measure, let it suffice to say that upon the failure of Jecker, in May, 1860, the bonds passed into the hands of his creditors.

France was likewise prompted to interfere, in order to seek redress for her alleged (and probably largely fraudulent) claim of $12,000,000, on account of certain wrongs committed by Mexico up to the year 1861.

While, therefore, the foreign creditors maintained that international obligations must be assumed by the successive governments of a state, the constitutional party claimed that the administration of Miramon was in no sense a government, but only an unsuccessful insurrection.

The way for foreign intervention was probably prepared by Miramon, Almonte, and other members of the Church party, who were anxious

that that party should regain some of the wealth and privileges of which it had been deprived by the constitutional government. Accordingly they were active in creating the belief abroad that Mexico was neither capable of self-government nor adapted to republican institutions.

The three Powers signed a convention in London, in October, 1861, the following article of which is important: —

"ART. II. The high contracting parties engage not to seek for themselves, in the employment of the coercive measures contemplated by the present Convention, any acquisition of territory, nor any special advantage, and not to exercise in the internal affairs of Mexico any influence of a nature to prejudice the right of the Mexican nation to choose and to constitute freely the form of its government." [1]

They further agreed to simply demand their debts, and if payment was refused, to take possession of Mexican ports and sequestrate the customs towards the liquidation of their claims.

It is unnecessary to dwell upon subsequent events. Hardly had the troops of the Allied

[1] See Annual Cyclopædia, 1861, p. 467.

Powers disembarked at Vera Cruz, when the designs of the unscrupulous Emperor of the French were disclosed. England and Spain indignantly withdrew, and Napoleon III. was thus left unrestrained to accomplish his purpose, long but covertly entertained, of placing an Austrian prince upon the Mexican throne.

Our interest in the invasion centres in the attitude of the Government of the United States from the announcement of the intentions of the foreign Powers to the ultimate withdrawal of the forces of Napoleon. It is the common opinion that the Emperor would never have committed himself to this unfortunate undertaking, had he not entertained the idea that the dissolution of the American Union had already begun. He was thus relieved of all fear of interference on the part of this Government, as its available resources were employed in the attempt to suppress the insurrection in the South.

That this Government, however, even in its crippled condition, was unchanged in its adherence to the Monroe Doctrine, appears from the following considerations: —

1. *From the moment when intervention seemed probable, explanations were demanded of France, and the assurance was given that her sole purpose was the enforcement of the claims of the subjects of the Emperor.*

The first communication was from M. Thouvenel to Mr. Dayton, the American Minister in Paris, in the fall of 1861, to the effect that "whatever England and France might do, it would be done in reference to realizing their money debt only."

This avowal was followed by another equally positive and plain. On June 5, 1862, Mr. Dayton wrote to Mr. Seward that M. Thouvenel had again assured him in regard to Mexico, "that the French troops did not go there to interfere with the form of government, nor to acquire an inch of territory, nor remain indefinitely in the country. All France sought was, that her existing 'griefs' should be settled, and *some* government established which other countries could treat with, and which would protect their commercial agents." [1]

Mr. Seward, on Aug. 23, 1862, wrote to Mr. Dayton: "This Government, relying on the explanations which have been made by France,

[1] Foreign Affairs, 1862, p. 348.

regards the conflict as a war involving claims by France which Mexico has failed to adjust to the satisfaction of her adversary, and it avoids intervention between the belligerents."[1]

The perfidy of Napoleon is apparent from the letter which he addressed to General Forey upon his assuming command of the French forces soon after the landing at Vera Cruz: —

"It is our interest that the United States shall be powerful and prosperous, but it is not at all to our interest that she should grasp the whole Gulf of Mexico, rule thence the Antilles as well as South America, and be the sole dispenser of the products of the New World. . . . If, on the contrary, Mexico preserves its independence and maintains the integrity of its territory, if a stable government be there established with the aid of France, *we shall have restored to the Latin race on the other side of the ocean its force and prestige.*"[2]

2. *During the entire period of the French occupation of Mexico the Government of the United States recognized only the Government of Juarez.*

Upon the acceptance by Maximilian of the Mexican throne in the summer of 1863, Napoleon saw that the pacification of the country

[1] Foreign Affairs, 1862, p. 377.

[2] See North American Review, vol. ciii. p. 106.

could be more easily achieved if the new Government should be immediately recognized by that of the United States.

Mr. Seward stated in his letter of Sept. 26, 1863, to Mr. Dayton, that while the United States had "neither the right nor the disposition to intervene by force on either side in the lamentable war which is going on between France and Mexico," yet it knew well that the normal opinion of the people of Mexico, influenced by popular opinion in this country, "favors a government there republican in form and domestic in its organization;" and that in the view of the President "this popular opinion of the United States is just in itself, and eminently essential to the progress of civilization on the American continent." He then remarked with great plainness, "that if France should, upon due consideration, determine to adopt a policy in Mexico adverse to the American opinions and sentiments which I have described, that policy would probably scatter seeds which would be fruitful of jealousies which might ultimately ripen into collision between France and the United States and the other American republics." [1]

[1] Foreign Affairs, 1863, p. 709.

Still later, in his letter to Mr. Dayton, of October 23, after referring to the fact that M. Drouyn de l'Huys (who succeeded M. Thouvenel as Foreign Minister) had intimated that an early acknowledgment of the proposed empire of Maximilian by the United States would be convenient to France, Mr. Seward stated, "that M. Drouyn de l'Huys should be informed that the United States continue to regard Mexico as the theatre of a war which has not yet ended in the subversion of the Government long existing there, with which the United States remain in the relation of peace and sincere friendship; and that, for this reason, the United States are not now at liberty to consider the question of recognizing a government which in the further chances of war may come into its place. The United States consistently with their principles can do no otherwise than leave the destinies of Mexico in the keeping of her own people, and recognize their sovereignty and independence in whatever form they themselves shall choose that this sovereignty and independence shall be manifested."[1]

In the mean time the attitude of the Emperor gave rise to warm discussions in the

[1] Foreign Affairs, 1868, p. 726.

Congress of the United States. On Feb. 3, 1863, Mr. McDougall, of California, in the Senate denounced "the proceedings of France as the most flagrant robber outrage that has been attempted by any modern civilized State."[1] And on April 4, 1864, a little less than two months before the landing of Maximilian at Vera Cruz, the joint resolution relative to Mexican affairs was passed by the National House of Representatives without a dissenting voice. It declared that "the Congress of the United States are unwilling by silence to have the nations of the world under the impression that they are indifferent spectators of the deplorable events now transpiring in the Republic of Mexico, and that they therefore think fit to declare that it does not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge any monarchical government erected on the ruins of any republican government in America under the auspices of any European power."[2] Mr. Davis, of Maryland, stated as the policy of the administration, "to cultivate friendship with our republican brethren of Mexico and South America, to aid

[1] Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3d Session; Appendix, p. 94.

[2] Ibid., 38th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1408.

in consolidating republican principles, to retain popular government in all this continent from the fangs of monarchical or aristocratic power, and to lead the sisterhood of American republics in the paths of peace, prosperity, and power."[1]

The passage of this resolution and the debate thereon produced great excitement in France, and war actually seemed imminent. When Mr. Dayton visited M. Drouyn de l'Huys at the Department of Foreign Affairs on April 21, the first words of the latter were, "Do you bring us peace, or bring us war?" However, President Lincoln was wisely conservative, and Mr. Dayton quieted the apprehensions of the French Minister by reading his instructions from Mr. Seward. These were frank and explicit, and concluded with the statement "that the proceedings of the House of Representatives were adopted upon suggestions arising within itself, and not upon any communication of the executive department, and that the French Government would be seasonably apprised of any change of policy upon this subject which the President might at any future time think it proper to adopt."[2]

[1] Congressional Globe, 38th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1408.

[2] See Annual Cyclopædia, 1864, p. 528.

3. *After the termination of the Civil War in the United States, the Government at Washington was more pronounced than ever in warning the Government of France of the consequences likely to follow the prolonged stay of the French troops in Mexico.*

It is true that Mr. Bigelow, who succeeded Mr. Dayton as Minister to France, stated that the Government of the United States would recognize the empire of Maximilian upon the immediate withdrawal of the French troops from the territory of Mexico. But this statement, made upon his own authority, was disapproved by the President. The Government of the United States was determined that the withdrawal of the French troops should depend upon no condition precedent. Accordingly Mr. Seward boldly declared the wishes and intentions of his Government. The diplomatic correspondence upon this subject is too voluminous to quote entire; but the following extract from a communication of Mr. Seward to Mr. Dayton, dated Dec. 16, 1865, leaves nothing to be desired by way of plainness and candor: —

"It has been the President's purpose that France should be respectfully informed upon two points; namely: —

"*First.* That the United States earnestly desire to continue and to cultivate sincere friendship with France.

"*Second.* That this policy would be brought into imminent jeopardy unless France could deem it consistent with her interest and honor to desist from the prosecution of armed intervention in Mexico, to overthrow the domestic republican government existing there, and to establish upon its ruins the foreign monarchy which has been attempted to be inaugurated in the capital of that country."[1]

After further correspondence it was officially announced on the 5th of April, 1866, that the French troops should evacuate Mexico; and in a little less than a year from that date they had all departed. It is generally believed, at least in this country, that this determination of the Emperor was largely due to the presence of General Sheridan on our southwestern frontier with a large detachment of the army placed in the field by the order of Congress for the national defence.

In conclusion, it is proper to remark that during this period the agitation of this subject in the Congress of the United States continued.

[1] See Foreign Relations, 1865; Annual Cyclopædia, 1865, p. 321.

Numerous resolutions were offered, especially in the House of Representatives, denouncing the conduct of the Emperor; and it was even proposed to aid the republicans of Mexico by a substantial national loan.

The sentiment of many Europeans upon the French occupation of Mexico found expression in the remark of a writer in the "London Times" in 1862, that the Emperor Napoleon had done a great political service to the world "in confirming the previous action of Spain in *extinguishing the Monroe Doctrine.*" A similar view was entertained by a writer in the "Westminster Review" of October, 1863, who asserted that "the occupation of Mexico is the extinction of the Monroe Doctrine. That doctrine, it must be owned, is both absurd and arrogant in theory and in practice." But that there were Europeans candid enough to admit that the policy of this Government was consistent with its previous adherence to the Monroe Doctrine, appears from the following impartial statement of Sir Edward S. Creasy: —

"The United States (occupied by their own Civil War which was then raging) did not actually send troops to oppose the French in Mexico, but

they steadily refused to recognize Maximilian, or any government except a republican government, in Mexico; and the language of their statesmen exhibited the fullest development of the Monroe Doctrine."[1]

[1] First Platform of International Law, p. 122.

CHAPTER VIII.

AMERICA NORTH OF THE UNITED STATES.

This subject is naturally treated in two divisions: —

1. *The disputed territory in the northwest.* — We have already seen that this dispute largely influenced President Monroe to declare his interdiction of further European colonization upon this continent;[1] but the subject should not be dismissed without brief reference to the other participants in the controversy, and to the peaceable adjustment of their long-standing differences.

The Spaniards early navigated the Pacific, and sent exploring parties northward along the line of the coast. They claimed by discovery in 1774 Nootka Sound, so called, on the western shore of Vancouver's Island; and in 1789 a Spanish expedition seized several English vessels moored there. The British Government at once assumed a hostile attitude and demanded reparation. The differences of the two Powers were settled by a treaty dated Oct. 28, 1790;

[1] See pages 12–16.

the terms of which chiefly applied to questions of navigation and fishery, and to trade with the natives, and did not determine the rights of either party to the sovereignty of any portion of America.[1]

By the Florida Treaty of Feb. 22, 1819, between Spain and the United States, his catholic Majesty ceded to the United States "all his rights, claims, and pretensions to any territories" north of the 42d parallel of latitude; so that Spain at once retired as a claimant to any territory north of that line.

The pretensions of Great Britain and the United States to the disputed territory were so indefinite that neither could possess a perfect title to the sovereignty of the same. Hence a treaty was signed on Oct. 20, 1818, by the provisions of the third article of which all the territories claimed by both parties, west of the Rocky Mountains, were left free and open to the citizens or subjects of both nations for two years; and by the convention of Aug. 6, 1827, those provisions were extended for an indefinite period, either party to give

[1] For all the treaties referred to in this chapter which were negotiated before 1845, see Greenhow's "History of Oregon and California and the other Northwestern Territories."

twelve months' notice to the other of its intention to annul and abrogate the same. Finally, by the treaty of June 15, 1846, the 49th parallel of north latitude was fixed as the dividing line, England renouncing all claim to the territory south thereof.[1]

Early in the present century a misunderstanding arose between Russia and the United States in regard to the trade carried on by citizens of the latter with natives of the North Pacific coast. In 1809, soon after diplomatic relations were established between the two nations, a desire was expressed by the Government of Russia for the adoption of some arrangement looking to a discontinuance of differences; but the correspondence terminated at once when it appeared that the Russian American Company claimed *the entire coast from Behring's Strait southward to and beyond the mouth of the Columbia River.*

The historic incidents related above, especially down to and including the treaties of the United States with Great Britain in 1818 and with Spain in 1819, are important in their bearing upon the validity of the claim of the United States to territory which Russia also

[1] See Public Treaties, 1875, p. 320.

claimed as her own. On the 16th of September, 1821, the Emperor of Russia issued an ukase, or edict, relative to trade on the northwest coast of America, accompanied by sixty-three rules establishing the boundaries for navigation along the coast and the order of naval communication. In these articles Russia asserted a territorial claim extending to the 51st degree of north latitude, and interdicted to all commercial vessels other than Russian, upon the penalty of seizure and confiscation, the approach upon the high seas within one hundred Italian miles of the shores to which that claim was made to apply.[1]

The Governments of both Great Britain and the United States were emphatic in the expression of dissent. A correspondence was at once begun between Mr. Adams, then Secretary of State, and the Chevalier de Poletica, the former denying the claim of Russia, and the latter asserting it upon the grounds "of first discovery, first occupation, and upon that which results from a peaceable and uncontested possession of more than half a century."

The discontinuance of this correspondence

[1] See British and Foreign State Papers, 1821, 1822, p. 472, et seq.

was the simple admission of an inability to agree. The United States did not abate one iota of their demands, and in July, 1823, Mr. Adams made the remark to Baron Tuyl already referred to, that we should contest the Russian territorial establishments on this continent, and that *no new European colonial establishments on this continent would be allowed.*[1]

A few months after, on December 2, came the declaration of President Monroe in his annual message, to the effect that while the differences with Russia and Great Britain as to the northwestern territory were likely to be settled by amicable negotiation, the occasion was an appropriate one to declare that the American continents "are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for colonization by any European powers."[2]

This declaration evoked from the Governments of Great Britain and Russia a decided protest; and it was regarded by many as premature, in that it defeated the arrangement already proposed for a joint convention between the three nations having claims to the disputed territory.[3] However, by separate conventions,

[1] See page 13. [2] See page 16.

[3] See Remarks of Mr. Calhoun, on p. 41.

one between the United States and Russia, signed at St. Petersburg on the $^{5}/_{17}$ of April, 1824, and the other between Great Britain and Russia, signed at the same place, Feb. $^{16}/_{28}$, 1825, the southern boundary of the Russian possessions was finally agreed upon and determined. Forty years after, when the ratification of the treaty[1] whereby these possessions were to be conveyed to the United States was under discussion in the United States Senate, Mr. Sumner remarked that by it "we dismiss one other monarch from the continent. One by one they have retired; first France; then Spain; then France again; and now Russia; all giving way to the absorbing Unity declared in the national motto, *E Pluribus Unum*."[2]

2. *Canada.* — In 1837 and 1838 an insurrection of a serious nature broke out in Canada. This was the occasion of the sending of Lord Durham to the revolting provinces, whose efforts at reorganization are so graphically portrayed by Mr. Justin McCarthy.[3] There was some discussion in this country as to the application of the Monroe Doctrine; but the only real difference with the British authorities was

[1] Public Treaties, 1875, p. 671. [2] Works, xi. 223.
[3] A History of Our Own Times, vol. i. chap. iii.

in relation to the capture and destruction of the steamboat "Caroline," which was employed upon the St. Lawrence by Canadian insurgents in carrying passengers and munitions of war from the American to the Canadian shore. Lord Ashburton in behalf of the British Government made a satisfactory acknowledgment, and the matter ended.[1]

The conflicts between Upper and Lower Canada about twenty years ago suggested the idea of a legislative union between the various British North American colonies. It is thought that the termination of our Civil War by the suppression of the insurrection in the Southern States also demonstrated to the Canadian people the practical advantages of such a union. At any rate, the union was effected by the Imperial act known as "the British North American Act, 1867;" and under the name of the Dominion of Canada were included Upper and Lower Canada (now called Ontario and Quebec), Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Manitoba, and British Columbia.

It was maintained by many that this consolidation was in derogation of the spirit of the

[1] Woolsey's International Law, § 163.

Monroe Doctrine; and a resolution was introduced in the House of Representatives, — but never put to a vote, — declaring the uneasiness of this country in the contemplation of "such a vast conglomeration of American States established on the monarchical principle, such a proceeding being in contravention of the traditionary and constantly declared principles of the United States, and endangering their most important interests." [1]

[1] See Creasy's First Platform, p. 121.

CHAPTER IX.

MINOR OCCASIONS ON WHICH THE DOCTRINE HAS BEEN APPLIED.

THE following are occasions which called forth little if any legislative discussion, but in which the Doctrine seems to have been applied from what might be termed a popular stand-point.

1. *The annexation of Texas to the United States.* — The independence of the Republic of Texas was acknowledged by the United States in 1837, by France in 1839, and by England, Holland, and Belgium in 1840. Mexico, however, did not relinquish her hopes of resubjugation; hence the final annexation of the republic to the United States, in 1845, gave rise to the war of Mexico with this country, commonly called the Mexican War.

The Northern opposition to the admission of Texas into the Union was due to a deep-seated aversion to the extension of slavery; but there was an argument at that time in favor of the admission which naturally received a strong

popular support. It was this; there was an apprehended danger of an infringement of the principle of the Monroe Doctrine, as Great Britain and France made no secret of their desire to see Texas under an English or a joint protectorate without slavery, and free from the control of the United States.

2. *The Spanish Invasion of Santo Domingo.* — Santo Domingo, or the Dominican Republic, comprising the eastern portion of the island of Hayti, declared its independence in 1844. Disorders continued until 1861, when Pedro Santana, a prominent political character, disheartened with the condition of affairs, invited Spain to resume dominion over the island. The Dominicans kept up a guerilla warfare, which, aided by the malarious climate and the irregular character of the country, proved very destructive to the Spanish troops. An appeal was made by the Dominicans to the United States and the other American republics for aid; but, occupied with the war with the South, the Government and people of this country could only offer their sympathy.

Convinced that the subjugation of the island could be attained only by the loss of blood and treasure, the Spanish Government determined

upon its abandonment. In July, 1865, the Spanish Governor-General insisted that as a condition precedent to his retirement, the Dominican Government should record a national declaration that the war which Spain had been waging was just and lawful, and that Spain withdrew, out of "respect to the preference of the Dominican people for an independent nationality." The Governor-General was compelled to recede from this position, but not until he had been informed by one of the Dominican commissioners that "the united Dominican people, without regard to rank or color, had planted the white cross of the republic on *the principle enunciated by the Great Mother of free nations, that America belongs to Americans, and we will endure all our trials over again sooner than desert it.*"[1]

3. *The war of Spain with Peru and Chili.* — Differences growing out of claims of Spanish residents of Peru against that country resulted in the forcible seizure by Spain in March, 1864, of the guano-yielding Chincha Islands. Great indignation was expressed not only by Peruvians but by all foreigners resident in Peru; and the citizens of the United States residing at Lima and Callao met April 27 and passed

[1] See Annual Cyclopædia, 1865, p. 754.

six resolutions emphatically affirming the principle of the Monroe Doctrine, and declaring that in the recognition of that doctrine "consists the safeguard and only defence of the sister republics of this continent."[1]

Early in 1865 a treaty was signed by the belligerents, which was afterward repudiated by Peru. Thereupon the republics of Bolivia, Chili, and Ecuador formed a defensive alliance with Peru, and on March 31, 1866, the Spanish fleet bombarded Valparaiso. This was succeeded by only a nominal continuance of the war; and on April 12, 1871, a peace conference was held at Washington under the presidency of Mr. Hamilton Fish, our Secretary of State. Its deliberations resulted in a convention which was signed by Mr. Fish as well as by the representatives of the other Powers, and in which the Government of the United States played an important part, as appears by the first two articles.

"ART. 1. By this convention the suspension of hostilities existing *de facto* between Spain on the one hand, and the allied republics of Bolivia, Chili, Peru, and Ecuador on the other, is changed into an armistice, or general truce.

[1] See Annual Cyclopædia, 1864, p. 654.

"ART. 2. This armistice shall last indefinitely, and it cannot be broken by any of the belligerents until three years after express and explicit notification shall have been given by one to the other of the intention to renew hostilities. *In this case such notification must be made through the Government of the United States.*" [1]

4. *The War of Chili with Peru and Bolivia.* — This recent contest has only partially called for an application of the Monroe Doctrine; but much has been said about its probable recurrence, — a subject to which Mr. Albert G. Browne, Jr., has adverted in his able paper upon "The Growing Power of the Republic of Chili." [2]

It was feared that the annexation of the nitrate-bearing provinces of Peru to Chili might

[1] See Annual Cyclopædia, 1871, p. 706. The interest of the United States in the affairs of the Southern republics is further shown by their mediatorial services in relation to the boundary dispute of Chili with the Argentine Republic. This vexed question was settled by treaty dated Oct. 2, 1881. In referring to the subject in his message to the Congress of the Argentine Republic in May, 1882, President Rocas said: "I must not omit to remind you of the names of the distinguished ministers plenipotentiary of the United States in Chili and the Argentine Republic. As you are aware, the question was at the worst when these gentlemen interposed their influence for the opening up of the new channels of negotiation, and continued using it until the final solution."

[2] Read before the American Geographical Society on the evening of Feb. 18, 1884.

lead to the interposition of the foreign creditors to whom those provinces had been hypothecated, and also that Peru might seek a European protectorate to save her from anarchy. However, none of the events consequent upon the termination of the late war have necessitated any fresh assertion by the Government of the United States of the application of the Monroe Doctrine, although the subject has given rise to much discussion by the press.

CHAPTER X.

CONCLUSIONS.

We present a summary of the views entertained both by the opponents and the advocates of the Monroe Doctrine.

The arguments in denial of the doctrine as a rule of action or as a principle of international law are briefly these: —

It is claimed that the doctrine is in a sense the outgrowth of the traditional American policy of non-intervention in European affairs; but this policy has not always obtained, — notably in the action of the United States relative to the liberation of Kossuth from Turkish restraint, and his removal from Turkish soil upon a United States war steamer in 1851.[1]

[1] When Kossuth fled to Turkey in 1849, his extradition was demanded by Austria and Russia; but on Sept. 1, 1851, he was allowed to embark on the United States war steamer "Mississippi," which in accordance with a resolution of the United States Senate had been despatched to carry him to America as the guest of the nation. Although he was received by both branches of the National Congress, there was a discussion in

The Monroe Doctrine has always failed of legislative confirmation.[1] The President has no right to declare a principle obligatory upon foreign nations, or even upon this country. This is not only the opinion of Europeans, but of many Americans, such as Calhoun, Clayton,[2] and Wilson, the last of whom, in a speech delivered in the United States Senate on Feb. 12, 1856, declared: —

"I am ready here to-day to vote for the Monroe Doctrine as laid down and defined by Mr. Adams in his message on the Panama mission; but until the Senate and House of Representatives adopt it, I think the less our statesmen at home and diplomatists abroad say about it, in dealing with international questions, the better."[3]

President Monroe condemned foreign coercion; that is, the forcible extension by the Allied

those bodies — especially in the Senate — as to whether the course pursued by the Government was or was not a departure from the policy of non-intervention in European affairs. (See Congressional Globe, vol. xxiv. part 1, and vol. xxv.)

[1] See pages 21, 56, 57. It is proper to remark that for the past half-century resolution after resolution upon the subject has been before both branches of Congress, only to be withdrawn or to be adversely reported upon by the committee to whom intrusted.

[2] See pages 72, 73.

[3] Congressional Globe, 34th Congress, 1st Session; Appendix, p. 87.

Powers of despotical institutions to this hemisphere, and not voluntary acceptance of the monarchical principle. He had in view military and political, and not social and industrial movements.[1] Hence all the arguments in favor of the modern application of the doctrine are illogical and untenable.

The principle of colonization is dead. If the language of President Monroe "expressed the intention that the South American republics should be prevented from freely surrendering their territory for the purposes of colonization, this was going altogether too far; it was avowing a rule of interference on our part equally to be condemned with the similar one acted on by European absolutists."[2] Besides, Mr. Adams, when President, practically qualified this part of the doctrine.[3]

Finally, as maintained by Mr. Calhoun, the declaration refers only to the Allied Powers, and contains no reference to resistance; and, so far as the Spanish-American republics are concerned, such recommendations as those of Mr. Polk upon the disturbance in Yucatan oblige

[1] See Catholic World, vol. xxxi. p. 133.

[2] Article of President Woolsey in Johnson's Cyclopædia, vol. iii. p. 590.

[3] See page 27.

us to become a party to all their wars.[1] This view is fortified by the consideration that the Latin races have never been successful colonists. The separation of the Spanish American colonies from the mother country did not bring stability, and was not followed by progress. There has been a constant fulfilment of the predictions of Bolivar, the Liberator of Colombia and Peru, that the South American countries would "inevitably fall into the hands of the unbridled rabble, and little by little become a prey to petty tyrants of all colors and races."[2] To become involved in their wars or disputes is to expose ourselves to annoyance, if not danger.

Resistance to foreign interposition may sometimes be necessary; but each case must be decided upon its merits. This is the very farthest the Government would be justified in going.[3]

The following may be regarded as a fair exposition of the arguments of those who support the doctrine: —

[1] See chap. iv.

[2] Bolivar's letter of Nov. 9, 1830, to General Flores.

[3] See pages 41, 42.

The removal of Kossuth from Turkish soil on an American war vessel, and his subsequent reception by the United States Congress, may possibly constitute an exception to the cherished traditional policy of non-intervention in European affairs; but the subject is one upon which American statesmen are not agreed. It must not be forgotten that by the adherence to that policy, even before its enunciation by Washington, the United States incurred the displeasure of France, under whose direction thousands of American ships were destroyed and their cargoes confiscated, — a proceeding which eventually gave rise to what is known as the "French Spoliation Claims." Notwithstanding this hardship, the policy was never renounced. Now the case of Kossuth was peculiar in this: the United States did not violate the rules of international law or of international comity, *nor was their action guided by any obligation to or with any foreign Power.* On the other hand, whenever an invitation has been extended by any European Government to that of the United States to enter into any arrangement relative to a contemplated movement in this hemisphere, it has, with one exception, been declined. The rule is shown by the declination of Mr. Rush for this Government to

participate in the contemplated European Congress upon Spanish-American affairs;[1] and by the refusal of the Government to become a party both to the proposed tripartite arrangement in 1852[2] and to the armed intervention in Mexico in 1862. The exception to the rule is the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which, according to the principles of international law, is voidable at the pleasure of the United States Government, provided Great Britain declines to agree to the desired modifications.[3] As to the affairs of these continents, Mr. Adams clearly shows that the acceptance by this Government of the invitation to participate in the deliberations of the Panama Congress was in accord with the policy of non-intervention.[4]

The declaration that the principle of colonization is dead is too sweeping and unguarded. It is true that the inhibition of President Monroe upon this subject was called forth by the dispute over the territory in the northwest.[5] But the word "henceforth" has plainly a future reference; and the statement[6] of Mr. Adams, which is declared by many to be a limitation of the Monroe Doctrine, as applied to colonization

[1] See page 10.
[2] See chap. vi.
[3] See page 73.
[4] See page 30.
[5] See pages 12–16, and chap. viii.
[6] See pages 27–29.

simply refers to the advisability of each American State to make for itself the declaration which Mr. Monroe made for the United States in 1823.[1] Interference by France in the affairs of Colombia[2] may present a recurrence of the question at any moment; and the present restless ambition of the French people for colonial extension affords a cause for apprehension.

The relation of the United States to the southern republics is a consideration of cardinal importance. The United States were the first nation to recognize their independence, and from that moment their resubjugation by Spain became an impossibility. Their subsequent recognition by Great Britain, therefore, was of no practical advantage. Hence the declaration of Mr. Canning in the House of Commons in December, 1826, "I called the New World into existence, to redress the balance of the Old,"[3] was nothing but grandiloquence. The position taken by the United States in relation to those republics is well shown by their action during the French intervention in Mexico. The careful but firm policy of Mr. Seward during this trying period was supplemented by

[1] See page 34. [2] See note, page 76.
[3] Annual Register, vol. lxviii. p. 204.

his frank avowal in his letter of June 2, 1866, to Mr. Kilpatrick, the American Minister to Chili: —

"We maintain and insist, with all the decision and energy compatible with our existing neutrality, that the republican system which is accepted by the people in any one of those (that is, Spanish-American) States shall not be wantonly assailed, and that it shall not be subverted as an end of a lawful war by European powers. We thus give to those republics the moral support of a sincere liberal, and we think it will appear a useful, friendship. . . . Those who think that the United States could enter as an ally into every war in which a friendly republican state on this Continent became involved, forget that peace is the constant interest and unswerving policy of the United States."[1]

The predictions of Bolivar have never been realized. This disappointed patriot failed to look into the future and behold the effect of the influence of the United States upon the social and political condition of the southern republics. This influence has been exerted in extending their good offices to further the settlement of boundary disputes and wars.[2]

The argument that the Monroe Doctrine can

[1] Foreign Relations, 1866, part ii. p. 413.

[2] See pages 119 and 120, note.

have no validity because it has never received legislative sanction, carries with it no weight. Many rules of international law impose an obligation derived from usage alone. The original declaration of Mr. Monroe is a precedent acknowledged by the American people, and to a certain extent acquiesced in by European authorities. Hardly a President since Mr. Monroe has omitted to refer to it in language of approval. It has always been regarded as a question independent of party politics, save perhaps in its application to the Congress at Panama. It has been persistently asserted by the majority of American statesmen; and to declare that it cannot obtain as a universal obligation is practically to throw discredit upon Washington's Farewell Address, whose recommendations, though never embodied in statutes or approved by resolution of Congress, have frequently shaped the foreign and domestic policy of the Government.

These positions are rendered impregnable by the fact, that though the doctrine gradually developed,[1] it was, to use the language of Mr. Everett, finally announced by President Monroe, "not merely with the approval of the British

[1] See chap. i.

Minister of Foreign Affairs, *but at his earnest and often repeated solicitations*." [1]

Finally, the Monroe Doctrine is to America what the Balance of Power is to Europe. The analogy may not be complete, because several nations in Europe unite to preserve a ratio of power, while on this hemisphere the influence of the United States is paramount. But it is this feature which is especially worthy of note. When or where has the Government of the United States extended its mediatorial services to its sister republics, save in the interests of peace and for the promotion of just and stable government? It was the influence of popular opinion in the United States upon the people of Mexico to which Mr. Seward emphatically referred in his communication of Oct. 9, 1863, to Mr. Motley, the American Minister to Austria. That the administration believed that this popular opinion had something more than a mere local influence, appears from the following passage from the same instructions: —

"The President, moreover, believes that this popular opinion of the United States is just in itself, and eminently essential to the progress of civilization on

[1] Letter in the "New York Ledger," Oct. 3, 1862. See also Sumner's "Prophetic Voices," p. 157.

the American continent; which civilization he believes can and will, if left free from European resistance, work harmoniously together with advancing refinement on the other continents." [1]

This prediction has been amply fulfilled in the twenty years which have elapsed since its announcement; and there never was a period when an adherence to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine was more likely to be productive of beneficial results to the people of both American continents than the present.

[1] Foreign Relations, 1863, part ii. p. 936.

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31197 01182 8966